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I. THE U-TURN 
T he early years of the twenty-first century mark a significant change in global affairs. During the 1980's and 1990's, the 
world was marching to the tune of neoliberalism, or so it seemed. 
With communism declining and eventually disintegrating, the en- 
tire globe finally opened up for business. Military conflict waned, 
defense spending dropped sharply, and the focus shifted from "war 
profits" to "peace dividends." The old ideological battles were 
over. History had "ended," we were told, giving way to a multicul- 
tural "global village." Borders were knocked down, trade and capi- 
tal mobility soared to unprecedented heights, immigration-legal 
and illegal-proliferated, and tourism became the leading growth 
sector. Governments the world over deregulated their economies. 
Privatization was hailed as the new path to efficiency and state as- 
sets were sold at fire sale prices. Budget deficits were curtailed and 
"sound finance" became the new orthodoxy. 
This new trajectory, argued its advocates, created a "new econo- 
my" of inflationless growth. High technology and global integra- 
tion promised a continuous supply-side boom, while cheap labor in 
"emerging markets," global competition, and resolute central bank- 
ers assured that the boom would not be spoiled by bottlenecks and 
rising prices. The panacea seemed so secure that most academics 
abandoned political economy. Instead, they invented a more excit- 
ing creature called "civil society," which they then "deconstructed" 
with a new antiphilosophy called "postmodernism." The whole pack- 
age was given a fashionable logo: "globalization." 
' This article was written in December 2004. It was submitted to Review in Febru- 
ary 2005 and accepted for publication in June 2005. 
REVIEW, XXIX, 1, 2006, 1-86 1 
2 Jon,athan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler 
But in 2001 the trajectory suddenly changed. The wave of cross- 
border capital flow has subsided and U.S. economic policy has 
turned from orthodoxy to profligacy. Multilateralism has given 
way to unilateralism. In issues ranging from the environment to 
trade agreements to war, the U.S. government seems to be walking 
its own course. Protectionism is no longer a dirty word, and there 
is even talk of "intra-capitalist conflict." The promotion of capital- 
ist peace has given way to preemptive strikes and rising military 
spending. Oil crises have reemerged from oblivion and the ghost 
of stagflation has came back to haunt even the free marketeers. 
As the world changed, so did the slogans. Talk of "free mar- 
kets" gave way to theories of "terrorism." Instead of "multicultural- 
ism," there was now a "clash of civilizations." In lieu of "competi- 
tion" came new "crusades" and "infinite wars," McJihads against 
McDonald's. Analysts of the "new economy," having lost their rat- 
ing with the melting stock market, were overtaken by the old pun- 
dits of "realpolitik" and "national security." 
Why Have the Pundits Got it Wrong? 
Although the experts have been quick to endorse the U-turn, 
the truth is that few if any anticipated it and most remain puzzled 
by its trajectory. What accounts for this lack of foresight and linger- 
ing confusion? How could so many analysts and theorists, both rad- 
ical and conservative, continue to project neoliberal globalization 
when the tide was clearly turning against it? What prevented them 
from foreseeing the coming bellicosity and the new wars, the rising 
oil prices, and the returning threat of stagflation? 
The issue here goes beyond prediction. It is not that the ex- 
perts gave us the wrong answers, but that they failed to ask the 
right questions. Of the many unasked questions, the most burning 
concern the institution of capital. The sad fact is that, these days, 
most of those who write on social affairs-global or local-know lit- 
tle about capital accumulation and care even less. And those who 
do deal with accumulation-namely the economists, including many 
Marxists-often use antiquated categories and theories that no 
longer fit present-day realties. 
To a large extent, the reason for this neglect lies in the victory 
of postmodern "discourse." Postliberal and postfascist writers find 
it more academically lucrative to "deconstruct" issues of ethnicity, 
culture, religion, and gender than to deal with the boring "texts" of 
political economy. Naturally, this subsidized preference keeps then1 
away from anything remotely connected to capital-their "alter7'/ 
"other" on which they want to know nothing. By contrast, post- 
Marxists retain the rhetoric of the "labor theory of value," paying 
customary tribute to the icons of "surplus value," "exploitation," 
"falling tendency of the profit rate," and "productive capital," 
among others. But these concepts have become sacrosanct deities. 
Most post-Marxists have lost any desire to question their meaning. 
Worse still, with "texts" having substituted for reality and the 
"imaginary" for facts, many post-Marxists increasingly keep their 
work clean of any trace of empirical research.' 
Toward a Dflerent Theory of Accumulation 
Unfortunately, capital rules the world, perhaps more effectively 
than ever, so those who ignore it are bound to misunderstand it (al- 
though, admittedly, they often continue to enjoy it). Capital also 
keeps changing, which means that those who do theorize it have to 
constantly rethink their concepts and to contrast those concepts 
with the changing reality. 
The aim of this article is twofold. We seek to develop a differ- 
ent understanding of what capital is and what constitutes accumu- 
lation, and, simultaneously, to use this new concept as a basis for 
reinterpreting contemporary capitalism, including its present U- 
turn. To set the stage, we begin in Section I1 by briefly critiquing 
contemporary explanations of the current U-turn in world affairs. 
Section I11 argues that the common shortcoming of these expla- 
nations lies in their inadequate concepts of value based on utility or 
abstract labor. The consequences of this inadequacy are twofold. 
' .4 recent Marxist conference irl which one of us (Nitzan) was a discussant illus- 
trates the new spirit. I criticized one of the presenters on my panel for dealing with 
pseudo-facts. She provided a theory for why neoliberalisln has made the world rnore 
unstable-yet without first denlonstrating that the world indeed has grown rnore 
unstable, or at least that our serlses tell us that it has. I used several charts with fairly 
silrlple indicators for unemployment, growth rates, and the stock ~llarket o show that 
the neoliberal period of the 1980's and 1990's was neither Inore nor less unstable 
than the earlier postwar years. My statistical intervention was 1101 challenged. Instead, 
it was deelrled irrelevant: "What are facts?!" lashed back the flabbergasted theorist 
(yes, in these very words). I'acts were time consuming, proble~llatic, and alnbiguous. 
Worse still, they were rrlerely "constructed" by rulers to ilnpose their power, so why 
bother? 
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First, by leaving the underlying units of accumulation ambiguous if 
not unobservable, the theory is unable to explain what accounts for 
the accumulation of money values. Secondly, by defining value in 
material terms, the theory keeps political economy bifurcated, with 
"politics" inherently external to the supposedly "economic" reality of 
accumulation. 
Sections IV, V, and VI outline an alternative, power theory of 
value. The theory builds on three related features. First, it empha- 
sizes differential accumulation rather than absolute accumulation; 
that is, the augmentation of power measured by relative asset 
growth rather than the amassment of utility or abstract labor em- 
bodied in material objects. Secondly, it stresses the importance of 
dominant capital groups rather than capital "in general" versus capi- 
tals "in competition"; in so doing it brings to the fore the political 
power that lies at the very heart of accumulation. And, thirdly, it 
points to two key regimes of differential accumulation that rely on cor- 
porate merger (breadth) and stagflation (depth) rather than on 
green-field growth and price stability. This theory yields a com- 
pletely different understanding of what constitutes accumulation 
and how it occurs-not "in connection" to politics, but as the cen- 
tral political process in capitalism. It also offers a ready template 
for empirical investigation-one that theories of capital based on 
utility or abstract labor cannot offer. 
Section VII examines the twentieth-century history of differ- 
ential accumulation. It identifies the pendulum swings between 
breadth and depth, as well as the long-term imperative toward the 
globalization of ownership and the transnationalization of the capi- 
talist ruling class. 
Section VIII situates the current U-turn within this framework. 
It argues that the current wars do not signal a return to old style 
state-centric imperialism, but rather that they may be part of a new 
cycle of depth accumulation by an increasingly global dominant 
capital. 
11. THE CONVENTIONAL CREED 
The sharp U-turn in emphasis from "growth" and "peace" to 
"stagflation" and "wars" has been accompanied by a heated debate. 
The main contention is ideological. Whereas during the period of 
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the global village the focus was on the costs and benefits of global- 
ization, now that the slogans changed, the dispute centers on the 
pros and cons of American imperialism. Endless effort has been 
put into concluding that the U-turn has been good or bad for hu- 
manity, depending on the preference. By contrast, far less energy 
has been spent in arguing basic concepts and establishing simple 
facts. What do the terms "globalization" and "American imperial- 
ism" precisely mean? Has the world indeed shifted from the former 
to the latter? How should we quantify the costs and benefits? Who, 
exactly, pays the cost and who reaps the benefits? Apparently, these 
are questions that most experts do not feel compelled to investi- 
gate too closely, or even ask. 
Neoliberal Wars 
Over the past few years, many "free market" strategists have be- 
come staunch supporters of the new wars. Their newly-found belli- 
cosity is certainly significant. Until not long ago, most of them be- 
lieved that peace and prosperity were brought by "liberalism" and 
"democracy" and that war and poverty were the consequence of 
"Bolshevism," "socialism," and other tyrannies. So why the sudden 
change? 
It all started with the fall of the Soviet Union. Overnight, the 
world had become "unipolar"; unipolar worlds are known for their 
instability, and instability is known to give strategic experts a 
change of heart. Presently, the center of global instability is the 
Middle East. The region is home to religious fundamentalism, anti- 
liberal culture, and plenty of weapons-conventional and other- 
wise. The region is also home to two-thirds of the world's oil re- 
serves and one-third of its daily output. Previously, superpower 
rivalry kept the lid on this toxic brew. But now, with the Soviet Un- 
ion gone, the mix of oil, fanaticism, and weapons is simmering, 
threatening both democracy and neoliberal prosperity. Evidently, 
the free countries of the world have no choice but to take up arms. 
The only way to defuse the Middle East threat once and for all is 
direct military intervention and, if need be, outright conquest. In 
the now-famous words of New York Times columnist Thomas Fried- 
man: 
For globalization to work, America can't be afraid to act like 
the almighty superpower it is. . . . The hidden hand of the 
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market will never work without the hidden fist . . . and the 
hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's 
technologies is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and 
Marine Corps (1999: 373). 
And so a new hybrid was born: neoliberal wars. 
Radicals were quick to denounce the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq-for much the same reason that the free marketeers loved 
them. For the most part, they, too, accepted that the new wars were 
part of a neoliberal American imperialism-only that, in their view, 
this imperialism was deplorable since it spelled the continued ex- 
ploitation and oppression of the postcolonial Third World. 
Unfortunately, few of those who espouse this position seem 
able to clearly define the concepts they use and show how these 
concepts explain the way American imperialism actually works. Is 
"American imperialism" a new breed of imperialism, or is it merely 
the contemporary reincarnation of what earlier took the form of 
Cold War imperialism, nineteenth-century British imperialism, Is- 
lamic imperialism, and Roman imperialism? Has there ever been a 
nonimperial capitalism, or is capitalism simply a form of imperial- 
ism? Who exactly are the rulers and subjects of this imperialism? Is 
the "American state" in the driver's seat-and if so, what constitutes 
that state? The Federal government? The White House? The Penta- 
gon? The American people? The Western countries? The govern- 
ments of those countries? The transnational corporations? The 
IMF and World Bank? Bill Gates? All of the above? Does the 
"American empire" serve the interest of capital-and if so, what ex- 
actly is this interest? Does the "American Empire" serve capital in 
general, or only one of its "fractions"? What criteria should we use 
to answer these questions? In what sense, precisely, are developing 
countries "exploited" and "oppressed"? By whom and to what ex- 
tent? Is China "dependent" on and exploited by the United States, 
or is it the other way around? How do we decide? Can the labor 
theory of value help us measure this exploitation and dependency? 
And if not-how do we know? 
These questions-once the basic staple of critical Marxism- 
seem to have disappeared. Few Marxists answer them and even few- 
er bother to raise them. Have these issues all been settled? Do they 
no longer matter? Or, perhaps asking them is simply too dangerous 
for what is now commonly referred to as the Marxist "tradition"? 
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The American Empire 
Ellen Meiksins Wood, for example, confidently defines globali- 
zation as the "economic imperialism of capital," with the United 
States as its "hegemon" (Meiksins Wood, 2002: 25). This new impe- 
rialism, she says, no longer has formal colonies and instead lever- 
ages itself through a system of sovereign nation-states. Indeed, "It 
has, in fact, been a major strategy of capitalist imperialism even to 
create local states to act as conduits of capitalist imperatives" 
(2002: 24). Unfortunately, many of these states are not sufficiently 
integrated into the system, and there is a constant risk that some of 
them will rebel against the "rule of global capital" (2002: 24). In or- 
der to minimize this risk and keep these states subordinated, there 
is a need for "a new doctrine of extra-economic, and especially mil- 
itary coercion." And since "even US military power cannot be eve- 
rywhere at once . . . the only option is to demonstrate, by frequent 
displays of military force, that it can go anywhere at any time, and 
do great damage" (2000: 25) Thus, the overriding purpose of wag- 
ing war now, declares Meiksins Wood, is not to conquer new terri- 
tory as such, but to "demonstrate US hegemony" (2002: 26). 
Many of those who fought hard against colonialism may be sur- 
prised to learn that they did so in the interests of the "American 
Empire." And the empire certainly seems to be in trouble. In the 
early 1950's, before academia discovered Gramscian "hegemony," a 
planeload of U.S. operatives was enough to topple Mossadegh and 
establish an Iranian regime friendly to the foreign oil companies. 
This was the pinnacle. From then on, the yield on U.S. "hege- 
mony" fell rapidly. In the early 1970's, a peasant army kicked the 
almighty American military out of Vietnam. By the early 2000's, a 
whole coalition of armies, equipped with smart weapons, high-tech 
communication, and state-of-the-art surveillance seems unable to 
restore even the semblance of order in a small peripheral country 
called Iraq. 
Contrary to Meiksins Wood's assertion, the U.S. military cannot 
"go anywhere at any time, and do great damage." In fact, with the 
exception of a surprise nuclear attack, there are very few places it 
can go to without putting itself at serious risk. Can the United 
States successfully attack China, India, Nigeria, Mexico, Russia, or 
Brazil? Even small renegade states such as Syria, Iran, and North 
Korea do not seem overly impressed by American threats, while 
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tiny underground militias show little hesitance in attacking U.S. as- 
sets around the world. Surely, the United States can conquer Gre- 
nada, or Haiti. But do such conquests "demonstrate U.S. hege- 
mony," or are they evidence of American decline? 
In the 1950's, macroeconomic indicators attested the super- 
power status of America. The country ran a balanced budget and 
enjoyed a current account surplus; its commodities flooded the 
world and it owned one-half of the world's foreign assets; the dol- 
lar was unchallenged and the public debt, accumulated mostly dur- 
ing the First and Second World Wars, remained stable at around $1 
trillion. From the late 1960's onward, though, there has been a 
marked deterioration in all of these categories. The trade surplus 
inverted into a growing deficit, the budget balance ballooned into 
a massive deficit, the ownership of foreign assets by U.S. residents 
was halved to one-quarter of the world total, and government debt 
rose to over $7.5 trillion-the world's largest. These developments 
were accompanied by the collapse of Bretton Woods, the establish- 
ment of the G7, the appearance of the Euro and currency baskets, 
and, most recently, a move toward an Asian financial union-all 
challenges to the U.S. dollar. 
Informal Empire 
According to Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, to characterize im- 
perial decline in this way would be grossly misleading. In their 
view, the American empire, like the British Empire in its early de- 
velopment, is largely "informal," built on the "economic and cultur- 
al penetration of other states" and "sustained by political and mili- 
tary coordination with other independent governments" (2003: 8). 
In this context, measurements based on formal state boundaries 
cannot reveal the underlying, informal power secured by interstate 
penetration. 
This comparison, though, is misleading, in that it ignores a very 
big difference between the two cases. With the British Empire, cap- 
ital penetrated mostly in one direction, from the core to the periph- 
ery. By contrast, in the American case capital moves in both direc- 
tions-inward as well as outward. 
But that is no cause for imperial concern. On the contrary, say 
Panitch and Gindin. These very developments, they argue, "sustain 
the American economy's ability to have privileged access both to 
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the world's savings and to cheaper goods" (2004: 72) (i.e., the abil- 
ity to run ever increasing current account deficits financed by ever 
growing capital inflow). The reason the Americans can enjoy this 
panacea, Panitch and Gindin continue, is that global integration 
puts everyone in the same boat and therefore limits the incentive 
for rivals to trigger a crisis. Global integration means "that a crisis 
of the dollar is not an 'American' crisis that might be 'good' for 
Europe or Asia, but a crisis of the system as a whole, involving se- 
vere dangers for all" (2004: 73). Finally, according to Panitch and 
Gindin we should not be misled by the mere ownership of assets: 
To suggest, as Arrighi does, that because the holders of 
American Treasury bills are now primarily in Asia we are 
therefore witnessing a shift in the regional balance of pow- 
er, is to confuse the distribution of assets with the distribu- 
tion of power (2004: 73). 
This logic makes the American empire truly unbeatable. Con- 
sider the following questions. If ballooning deficits and debt are 
signs of imperial strength (more debt-financed consumption for 
Americans), should we conclude that falling deficits and debt are 
signs of imperial weakness? Or could we treat both as signs of 
strength? Similarly, if a dollar crisis is "systemic," and therefore 
harmful also to other countries and regions, should we then con- 
clude that a strong dollar is systemic as well, and therefore good 
for everyone, not just the American empire? Finally, if the distribu- 
tion of global assets in favor of Asia is not a sign of power as Gio- 
vanni Arrighi argues, what is a sign of power? How could Ameri- 
can investment in China and Chinese investment in the United 
States both be evidence of American power? 
During the Industrial Revolution, the rise of the European 
bourgeoisie and the decline of its aristocracy were accompanied by 
a redistribution of income from landed rent to industrial profit 
and financial interest. Do such links no longer matter? Have we 
reached the point where class processes are no longer related to in- 
come? Has power been divorced from the distribution of owner- 
ship? Perhaps-but then why talk about the "world capitalist order"? 
If the United States continued to borrow every year the equivalent 
of 5% of GDP, at what point would this borrowing start to weaken 
10 Jonathan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler 
its "informal empire"? Has this power not been weakened already? 
How do we know?' 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
American weakness is the starting point of David Harvey's ver- 
sion of the "New Imperialism" (Harvey, 2003). The United States, 
he asserts, "lost its superiority in production after 1970 and may 
well now be losing financial dominance, leaving it with military 
might alone" (2003: 82-83). It is this loss of superiority that ex- 
plains the new global bellicosity. 
The theoretical underpinnings of Harvey's claim can be sum- 
marized as follows. Accumulation takes two basic routes. The first 
route is expanded reproduction. Expanded reproduction creates 
new value and new surplus, the bulk of which gets accumulated. 
The process, of course, is far from smooth. Indeed, left to its own 
devices and to Marx's theory of the falling rate of profit, expanded 
reproduction tends to produce crises of overaccumulation. Capital- 
ists have several options to deal with such crises. They can accept re- 
distribution in favor of workers to help absorb the excessive surplus; 
they can let their capital devalue; or they can go for a "spacio-tem- 
poral fixn-a term that Harvey invented to describe geographical 
expansion into previously noncapitalist areas and forms of repro- 
duction on the one hand, and long-term, mainly infrastructural in- 
vestments on the other. 
Naturally, of the three options, the most acceptable to capitalists 
is Harvey's spacio-temporal fix. And, yet, unfortunately for capital- 
ism, the fix generates its own contradictions: eventually, it recre- 
ates overaccumulation wherever it is applied. In the international 
context, this recreation leads to intensified competition between a 
"Let us be blunt about it," says Martin Wolf, 
The U.S. is now on the comfortable path to ruin. It is being driven along a 
road of ever rising deficits and debt, both external and fiscal, the risk of de- 
stroying the country's credit and the global role of its currency. It is also, not 
coincidentally, likely to generate an unmanageable increase in U.S. protec- 
tionism. Worse, the longer the process continues, the bigger the ultimate 
shock to the dollar and levels of domestic real spending will have to be. 
Unless trends change, 10 years from now the U.S. will have fiscal debt and 
external liabilities that are both over 100 percent of GDP. It will have lost 
control over its economic fate ("America is Now on the Comfortable Path to 
Ruin," Financial Times, Aug. 18, 2004, 11). 
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growing number of countries, all burdened by their own overac- 
cumulation and all seeking outlets for their excessive surpluses. 
This increasing congestion pushes capitalism toward the sec- 
ond route of primitive accumulation, or, in Harvey's vocabulary, 
"accumulation by dispossession." In contrast to expanded repro- 
duction where accumulation occurs through the appropriation of 
newly-created surplus, dispossession relies on the appropriation of 
existing surplus or the bare subsistence of others. Whereas ex- 
panded reproduction works through the seemingly peaceful mech- 
anism of the market, accumulation by dispossession relies on pow- 
er, with the use of numerous techniques, ranging from stock market 
manipulation, through debt crises, to the commodification of na- 
ture, and open military conquest. 
Historically, expanded reproduction and accumulation by dis- 
possession have oscillated countercyclically, according to Harvey. 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, overaccumulation 
at the core led to dispossession through imperialist expansion. Brit- 
ain was increasingly challenged by other overaccumulators, and the 
conflict eventually culminated in two world wars. The emergence in 
1945 of the United States as the new hegemon made expanded re- 
production once more the main engine of global capitalism. But 
since the 1970's, with Europe and Japan making a comeback and, 
more recently, with East Asia developing its own overaccumulation, 
the pressure for accumulation by dispossession re-emerged. The new 
wars in the Middle East are the newest manifestation of this preda- 
tory process. The United States is trying to arrest its hegemonic de- 
cline, and it is "looking to control oil supplies as a means to counter 
the power shifts threatened within the global economy" (Harvey, 
2003: 80-81). 
Besides the new vocabulary, the argument adds little substance 
to existing theories of imperialism, particularly those articulated by 
the Monopoly Capital school. But there is a difference. Earlier 
theorists of monopoly capitalism, such as Kalecki (1971a; 1971b; 
1972), Tsuru (1956), Steindl (1976), Baran & Sweezy (1966), and 
Magdoff (1969; 1972), took great pains to both theoretically con- 
ceptualize and empirically investigate the processes of accumula- 
tion they wrote about; regardless of whether they were right or 
wrong, their research methods stand as beacons for generations to 
come. Harvey, by contrast, does neither. 
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Instead, he begins by setting up two parallel worlds. The first 
world, that of expanded reproduction, works according to the rules 
of Marx's general theory of accumulation. This is where labor 
value, surplus value, capital accumulation, and overaccumulation, 
are determined. The other world, that of accumulation by dispos- 
session, obeys none of these rules. This separation stands in the- 
ory. In practice, though, the two worlds get mixed up, and accord- 
ing to Harvey that mixture makes it hard to "discern how the stern 
laws of economics work behind all the smoke and mirrors" (2003: 
79). 
Stated in passing, the problem reads like a mere technicality. It 
is not. Harvey confidently asserts that "Global capitalism has expe- 
rienced a chronic and enduring problem of overaccumulation 
since 1970s" (2003: 64). But then, being unable to separate the 
"stern laws of economics" from the "smoke and mirrors," how does 
he know that the problem-assuming there was one-indeed was 
one of overaccumulation? In order to draw such a conclusion, he 
needs, first, to clearly define and empirically measure "accumula- 
tion" in the context of "expanded reproduction"; secondly, to 
explain and empirically illustrate actual cases of "normal" accumu- 
lation; thirdly, to empirically show how concrete instances of "over- 
accumulation" differ from this "normal" accumulation; and, last 
but not least, to show how, in a world "distorted" by "smoke and 
mirrors," he can disentangle the effect of "accumulation by dispos- 
session" from that of "overaccumulation." 
Harvey does none of those things. Having no data at his dispos- 
al, he sends the reader to Robert Brenner, whose empirical work 
presumably constitutes evidence for the overaccumulation crisis 
(2002). Unfortunately, this latter work provides no such evidence. 
Brenner does supply plenty of data. But his data measure rates of 
profits and other earthly indicators, not labor values; and since 
these indicators reflect both the "stern laws" and the "smoke and 
mirrors," they cannot prove anything about the underlying over- 
accumulation in the realm of expanded reproduction. Moreover, it 
is clear, even from Brenner's conventional account, that U.S. rates 
of profit have been on an uptrend since the early 1980's-which 
makes one wonder how this uptrend could constitute evidence of 
"chronic and enduring" overac~umulation.~ 
q t  is unclear whether Harvey believes his theory could indeed be "proven," let 
alone "refuted." In his Limits to Capital he plays both cards: "While the idea of value 
Finally, there is the issue of oil. Harvey seems to accept at face 
value the realist belief that "American power" depends on control- 
ling the global oil valve, with his own added bit that this control 
represents "accumulation by dispossession." And maybe both of 
these claims are correct-only that Harvey does not explain how 
and why. Suppose the U.S. government were in control of oil. 
Would it stop selling it to China and Japan? Probably not. Would it 
raise the price? Perhaps-but, then all firms-"American" and "non- 
Americanv-would have to pay the higher price, so where would the 
imperial gain come from? Would the government give discounts to 
U.S. companies, and if so, how would it prevent them from re-sell- 
ing the oil at the higher world price? How should we compute the 
cost to the "American empire" of gaining control over global oil? 
What if the cost exceeded the benefit? Should we then speak of 
"decumulation by disposse~sion'~? Who, exactly, would pay for this 
cost and who would reap the benefits? Again, there may be con- 
vincing answers to each of these questions, but Harvey does not 
even ask them. 
111. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: THEORY IN PARALYSIS 
In our view, the paralysis of Marxist theory is rooted in the sim- 
ple fact that most Marxists have stopped thinking about the con- 
cept that matters most: capital. True, scholarly and popular Marx- 
ism is replete with references to the "logic of capitalism," the 
"interest of the capitalist class" and the inevitability of "accumula- 
tion crises." But for the most part, these references are lip service. 
With the exception of a few diehards, most have ceased to question 
the theoretical meaning of accumulation and to investigate its ac- 
tual gyrations. 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
as an accounting tool or as an empirically observable magnitude plainly had to be 
abandoned," he says, "it could still be treated as a 'real phenomena with concrete ef- 
fects'. . . . It could be constructed as the 'essence' that lay behind the 'appearance,' the 
'social reality' behind the fetishism of everyday life" (1999: 36). 
The question is whether this "essence" generates a worldview that is both system- 
atic and refutable. No one can "see" an electron, but quantum physics has been able to 
use the concept as a basis for systematic predictions. Can we do the same with value? 
Can we use it to predict production, prices, profits, or anything else? Can value anal- 
ysis ever fail? 
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Radicals justly criticize liberal theories for espousing concepts 
and frameworks that no longer relate to the real world. And in- 
deed, at its core, neoclassical economics has remained more or less 
unchanged for a century. But can we not say the same thing about 
Marxism? Of course, there have been endless debates and numer- 
ous innovations, but the fundamental categories and processes that 
Marx set up in his Das Kapital have remained pretty much intact. 
Over the past century, Marxists have provided plenty of new an- 
swers. But what we really need are new questions. 
And the most burning question is simple enough: "What exact- 
ly is capital?" Presently, there are two answers to this question, each 
based on a long-standing myth: the liberal myth of utility and the 
Marxist myth of abstract labor. Both myths have had a historical 
mission. The first helped justify the rising bourgeois order; the 
second was a weapon to fight it. Both have run their course. They 
both need to be challenged. 
Capital Without Power 
The form of capital is unambiguous. Capital appears to us as a 
money-yielding asset, whose quantity is simply the amount it is 
worth in dollars and cents. There is a debate between neoclassicists 
and Marxists over what makes something an asset and what deter- 
mines its monetary magnitude, but the general boundaries of this 
debate are clearly marked. In particular, both sides agree that capi- 
tal is a "material" substance whose essence is rooted in the "reality" 
of production and consumption. This agreement completely divor- 
ces the analytical category of capital from power, with devastating 
consequences for political economy. 
The supposedly material essence of 'capital on the one hand 
and the processes of power on the other are seen as embedded in 
two parallel worlds-"economics" and "politics." Liberals use this 
duality to justify the rule of capital and demand less "political in- 
tervention" in the name of more "economic efficiency"; radicals 
try to do the opposite by showing how "bourgeois politics" bolsters 
"capitalist economics"; and in both cases, the duality keeps the 
analysis of capitalism inherently bifurcated and hopelessly frac- 
tured. 
Consider this bifurcation more closely. In their analysis, ortho- 
dox economists have tended to abstract from power altogether. As 
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Joseph Schumpeter put it, capital for them "consisted of goods," 
and specifically of "produced means of production'' (1954: 632- 
33). Since John Bates Clark's The  Distribution of Wealth (1965 
[1899]), the "magnitude" of capital is thought of as being inti- 
mately connected to the productive output of capital, measured in 
"utils." The link works as follows. The income of the capitalist is 
assumed to be proportionate to the (marginal) output of her capi- 
tal; the ratio of income to capital sets the rate of return; and the 
rate of return determines the maximum pace at which capitalists 
can add to, or accumulate, their capital stock (with all quantities 
measured in so-called "real," material terms). 
The process of accumulation is entirely "economic." Being fully 
governed by perfect competition and equilibrium, it leaves no 
room for power. The only way for power to enter the picture is 
from the outside. The "intrusion" of power is said to run havoc by 
"distorting" accumulation and undermining "efficiency7'-and yet, 
miraculously, it has no bearing on the substance of capital itself. 
This immunity to power is fully reflected in the way national 
statisticians conceive of and "measure" capital (a category that they 
often refer to, more benignly, as "wealth"). According to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, "wealth, in the broadest sense, consists 
of resources with the capacity to produce output and income" 
(1999: M-3). And since output and income are supposedly made of 
universal, time-invariant "utils," the wealth that produces these 
"utils" must also be made of the same universal building blocs. 
Based on this logic, a piece of "capital" circa 2000 BC is quanti- 
tatively comparable to a piece of "capital" dated 2000 AD; we can 
say, for example, that a modern tractor is 92,135 times bigger than 
an ancient plow. Similarly with various "capitals" at a given point in 
time. For the statisticians, machines, software, structures, automo- 
biles, houses, schools, military hardware, and religious buildings 
are all "wealth." Presumably, they all generate output and income 
measured in universal "utils," and, therefore, they are all quantita- 
tively comparable.4 This quantitative equivalence is strictly restrict- 
"These comparisons are made regularly and with great "precision" (assuming you 
accept their underlying premise). Thus, according to the U.S. Department of Com- 
merce's "Fixed Asset Tables," in 2002 the country's fixed assets, prorated in terms of 
their ability to generate "utils," consisted of 16.1% private equipment and software, 
23.3% private nonresidential structures, 39.7% residential structures, and 20.9% gov- 
ernment assets. The statisticians also knew to tell us by how much each type of asset 
had grown over time. According to the same tables, from 1972 and 2002 the "quanti- 
16 Jonathan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler 
ed to the realm of productivity and is completely independent of 
power. Whether the wealth is produced by slaves, serfs, workers, 
free human beings, or perpetual motion is entirely irrelevant to its 
quantity. 
In contrast to the neoclassicists, Marx saw capital as impossible 
without power. Means of production, he said, became capital only 
when they were privately owned for the purpose of making profit, 
and private ownership could not exist unless backed by power. Fur- 
thermore, power mattered a great deal for the actual process of ac- 
cumulation. Mediated through the class struggle, power affected 
both the rate of profit and the level of production, and hence the 
volume of profit that can be plowed back as investment for the pur- 
pose of accumulation. 
But as in the neoclassical case, here, too, power has no bearing 
on the "magnitude" of capital as such. That magnitude, conceived 
as "value," is equal to the abstract labor time socially necessary for 
producing the capital. And once the capital has been produced, 
power no longer matters. From that point onward, its value (or 
process of devalorization) depends only on the pace of deprecia- 
tion (through wear and tear) and the rate of technical change 
(through obsolescence). Granted, power remains crucial for the 
broad understanding of capitalism, and processes related to class, 
ideology, monopolization, finance, state institutions, and imperial- 
ism are still central to Marxist analyses. But unless these processes 
affect depreciation or technology, they are irrelevant for the value 
of capital itself.' 
And so emerged a theoretical no-man's land separating power 
from capital. Fernand Braudel, who saw "capitalism" as a power 
system distinct from the "market," was forced, for lack of an alter- 
native, to fall back on the "reality" of capital goods, that, in his 
words, "can after all be grasped, touched, and unequivocally de- 
fined" (1985: 11, 239). 
ty" of "util-generating wealth" embedded in engines and turbines rose by 47%; in re- 
ligious structures by 49%; in education structures by 69%; in missiles by 99%; and in 
aircraft by 195 percent. (The Department of Commerce's "Fixed Asset Tables" are 
available from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/home/fixedassets.htm.) 
' It is significant to note here that Marxists were unable to come up with their 
own measures for capital based on labor values, primarily due to the hurdle of reduc- 
ing concrete to abstract labor without relying on wages. And, so, in their empirical 
work they continue to use the official, neoclassical statistics, complete with its utilitar- 
ian, nondialectical biases. 
Is there a solution? Can power be incorporated into the Marxist 
and neoclassical definitions of capital? In our view, the answer is 
"no." Political economy, both mainstream and radical, has been 
deeply influenced by the mechanical worldview of Kepler, Galileo, 
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Leibniz, and, above all, Newton. Following 
Newton, political economy is seen as a "mechanism" governed by 
the tendency toward "equilibrium" (and its deviant, "disequilib- 
rium"). Equilibrium, in turn, requires a common unit, an underly- 
ing, immutable "substance" that everything else is made of. In the 
physical world this basic unit is hydrogen; in the economy, it is "ab- 
stract labor" or "utility." 
Thus, when Milton Friedman declares that "there is no such 
thing as a free lunch," he echoes Antoine Lavoisier, the eighteenth- 
century French tax collector who invented the Law of Con- 
servation of Matter. With this Law in mind, political economists, 
both Marxist and neoclassical, came to believe that there was "in- 
trinsic equivalence" in production and exchange. Abstract labor 
and utility, like all matter, could neither disappear into nor be cre- 
ated out of thin air. For Marx, who approached the process from 
the input side, the commodity's value was transformed labor: the 
live abstract labor socially necessary to produce the capital reap- 
peared as dead abstract labor in the newly produced capital. Simi- 
larly for the neoclassicists, who view the process from the output 
side: as the quantity of capital depreciates, the lost utils resurface- 
albeit suspended until they are consumed-in the goods and serv- 
ices being produced." 
The answer of both theories to the question "what is capital?" 
lies in this transformation. In both cases, the pecuniary appear- 
ance of capital is merely the mirror image of its material substance, 
made of utils or abstract labor. The financial liabilities on the 
right-hand side of the balance sheet derive their value from-and in 
the final analysis, are equivalent to-the productive assets on the 
left-hand side. 
This belief makes it clear why both definitions of capital have to 
exclude power. Given that the institutions of power are qualitative, 
not quantitative, and since power is considered external to the pro- 
ductive substance of capital, it follows that power can only be "re- 
' Of course, in each theory input or output are just the starting point, and the 
conservation continues through subsequent cycles in the input-output chain. 
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lated" to capital from the "outside." It can never make it into its ba- 
sic definition. 
Utility, Abstract Labor, or the Nomos? 
But what if this belief is wrong? What if intrinsic equivalence 
does not exist? In order to know one way or the other, we need to 
be able to measure utils and labor values. We also need to identify 
equilibrium (since equivalence does not work in disequilibrium). 
And, unfortunately, political economists have been able to do nei- 
ther.7 
According to Thorstein Veblen, this inability lies in their failure 
to comprehend the holistic quality of the social process in general 
and the "industrial system" in particular. In his view, which resem- 
bles both Alfred Whitehead's process philosophy and David Bohm's 
hologramic metapliors, social production is a qualitatively chang- 
ing "joint process," interleaved over time and space.' There is no 
way to objectively unbundle this process into a quantitative input- 
output schema, even on paper, and therefore no way to explain 
prices by abstract labor or utility. 
To illustrate the unbundling problem, try to imagine the entire 
process, from start to finish, of producing a pharmaceutical drug, a 
In order to denote the "substance" of capital in universal units, political econ- 
omists would need to overcome three obstacles, all of which are insurmountable. 
First, they would have to explain how we could convert qualitatively different outputs 
into universal utils (in the neoclassical case), or qualitatively different forms of con- 
crete labor into homogenous units of abstract labor (in the Marxist case). Secondly, 
they would have to identify the particular utils produced by a particular type of capital 
(neoclassical), or the exact number of abstract labor hours that went (on average) into 
making a particular type of machine (Marxist). And, thirdly, they would have to show 
that the capital measurements they came up with were indeed unique; in other words, 
that the "substance" of a specific factory, when measured as "capital," has one quantity, 
and one quantity only. On the impossible conversion of quality into quantity, sek for ex- 
ample Castoriadis (1984) and Nitzan (1989). The issue of input-output indeterminacy 
was pointed out by Steadman (1975; 1977). The problem of providing a unique meas- 
ure of "real" capital was first identified by Veblen (1975; 1961~)  and Wicksell (1935), 
and later gave rise to the "Cambridge Controversies" of the 1950's and 1960's (cf. 
Robinson, 1953-54; Sraffa, 1960; Harcourt, 1969). 
Veblen has been forgotten by many older political economists and is totally un- 
known to most younger ones. His twokey books, The Theory of Business ~nteiprise 
(1975) and Absentee Ownership (1967), should be made required reading for every stu- 
dent (and teacher) of political economy. On process philosophy, see Whitehead 
(1978). For the metaphoric use of holograms, see Bohm (1980) and Bohm & Peat 
(2000). 
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modern automobile, or a Hollywood movie. Even if we could 
somehow observe and measure utils or socially necessary abstract 
labor, still, is there a way of knowing which input "contributes" how 
much to which output? 
Conventional analyses of value and price, whether Marxist or 
neoclassical, usually ignore free inputs and outputs. This exclusion 
presents a serious conceptual problem. Many inputs and outputs 
are free not because they are gifts of nature or because they do not 
"contribute" to production, but because their potential owners lack 
the power or desire to commodify them.g But, then, if power af- 
fects what is included in and excluded from the input-output map, 
how could it be ignored? 
Do we even know all the "inputs7' and all the "outputs"? What 
is the starting point of the production process-say, of an automo- 
bile? The excavation of the raw materials? The design of the auto- 
mobile? The invention of the computer used in that design? The 
invention of the computer language? Of binary mathematics? Of 
the zero? How far and to what degree does any one input affect the 
various possible outputs? For instance, how does modern chemistry 
simultaneously feed into the production of drugs, automobiles, and 
movies? What other production processes does chemistry feed 
into? Can we measure the "extent" of its separate impacts? 
The truth is that we do not know the answers to these ques- 
tions, and-if Veblen, Whitehead and Bohm are right-we cannot 
know. We cannot unbundle a package whose separate components 
could not be specified to begin with.'' 
So we are back to square one, if not square zero. We still do not 
know what makes something capital and what determines its mag- 
nitude in dollars and cents. Worse still, now we no longer have the 
principle of intrinsic equivalence to build on. Is this rejection not 
' Compare the IBM personal computer that was made freely available for cloning 
with the rather expensive "invention" of Microsoft Windows (Microsoft commodified 
Windows after taking the idea from Apple, gratis); compare the free domestic labor 
of women with their paid labor in the office; compare free university education in 
Sweden with costly post-secondary schooling in the United States; or contrast the free 
pollution of factories prior to the Kyoto Accord with their commodified effluence 
after the Accord's implementation. 
lo In that sense, Neo-Ricardians attempt to show that the internal contradictions 
of neoclassical production functions and Marxist value equations were superfluous 
(cf. Sraffa, 1960; Steedman, 1977). These latter critiques were logically brilliant and po- 
litically expedient. But from a Veblenian perspective they were redundant: in practice, 
the equations they sought to criticize could not even be written. 
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detrimental to the very possibility of political economy? By giving 
up the material basis of capitalism, are we not cutting the branch 
we sit on? Indeed, is there anything else-other than utility or labor 
value-with which we can explain the quantitative order of prices, 
exchange and distribution? 
The short answer is "yes." There is an alternative. According to 
Cornelius Castoriadis (1984), this alternative was articulated some 
2,500 years ago, by Aristotle. Equivalence in exchange, Aris totle ar- 
gued, came not from anything intrinsic to commodities, but from 
the nomos. It was rooted, says Castoriadis, not in the material 
sphere of consumption and production, but in the broader social- 
legal-historical institutions of society. It was not an objective sub- 
1 I 
stance, but a human creation. 
And when we think about this question without theoretical 
blinders, this loose determination is not that difficult to fathom. 
Consider the ratio between the price of petroleum and the wages of 
oil rig workers; between the value of Enron's assets and the salaries 
of accountants; between General Electric's rate of profit and the 
price of jet engines; between Halliburton's earnings and the cost of 
"re-building" Iraq; between Viacom's taxes and advertisement rates. 
Why should we insist that these ratios are somehow determined by 
relative utility or relative abstract labor time? Why should we believe 
in quanta that could not be shown to exist, and that no one-not 
even those who need to know them in order to set prices-has the 
slightest idea of what they are? Is it not possible that these ratios are 
simply the outcome of social struggles and cooperation? 
Most political economists prefer to steer clear of such a loose 
determination. The ideological stakes are simply too high. If prices 
and distribution were not determined by objective productive con- 
tributions, neoclassicists would have nothing with which to explain 
income and justify profit. Similarly for Marxists: without labor val- 
ues there is no objective basis to condemn capitalist exploitation. 
Unfortunately, and as already noted, this insistence on objective 
determination is mostly a formality. In practice, political econo- 
mists are entirely dependent on a very loose determination of pri- 
ces and distribution. In the neoclassical case, this dependency is 
evident when economists set up perfectly competitive equilibrium 
We are deeply indebted to Akiva Orr for introducing us to the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis. Orr carries on the spirit of Castoriadis-both in his activism and in his pro- 
found writings on philosophy, history, science, and democracy (www.autonarchy.org.il). 
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models-and then fit them to reality with the generous help of end- 
less "distortions" (in the know-all language of the news agencies: 
"oil prices have risen because of excess demand from China"; and a 
day later, "despite excess demand from China, oil prices have fallen 
amid easing security concerns at Ras Tanura"). Marxists do the 
very same thing when they first articulate the fundamental laws of 
expanded reproduction and immediately violate them with the 
endless mischief of "force," "manipulation," and "accumulation by 
dispossession." Now, this mixture of hard and loose determination 
would be scientifically acceptable if we could somehow draw the 
line separating the "objective" laws from their "distortions." But 
neither neoclassicists nor Marxists can do so, even on paper: the 
basic units of utility and abstract labor underlying these laws are 
unobservable, directly or indirectly; and even if they were observ- 
able, there is no inherent reason why human beings would have to 
obey any "objective" law based on such units. 
This critique does not imply social chaos. Far from it. Society is 
not a formless mass and its history is not a mere collection of acci- 
dents. There are rules, patterns, and a certain logic to human affairs. 
But these structures are created, articulated, and instituted not from 
the outside, but by society itself. They are manifested through relig- 
ion, the law, science, ideology, conviction, habit, and force. Al- 
though embedded in the physis, they are all creatures of the nomos. 
Whether imposed by rulers for the sake of power or crafted by the 
demos for their own happiness, they are all made by human beings. 
The above considerations are crucial for our purpose here, for, 
if we start from the nomos rather than utility or labor value, we end 
up with a completely different concept of capital, a radically differ- 
ent understanding of accumulation, and new ways to interpret capi- 
talist development. 
IV. CAPITAL AS POWER 
The Unit of Order 
Every order-in society, as in nature-is articulated, or gener- 
ated, through categories and forms.''   he most potent of these are 
" We use "order" here to denote a pattern. Order in this sense can be static or 
dynamic, stable or unstable, and it carries no normative connotations. 
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numbers. The greater our ability to use numbers, the more accu- 
rate and comprehensive our capacity to articulate order. In capital- 
ism, the fundamental numerical unit is price. In principle, this unit 
can be assigned to anything that can be owned. In that sense, eve- 
rything that can be owned-from natural objects, through pro- 
duced articles, to social organizations, ideas, and human beings- 
can also be quantified. Moreover, the quantification is uniform 
across time and space. Prices in Europe of the Middle Ages are 
readily comparable to prices in India of the twenty-first century. 
This uniformity enables ownership to be intricately interrelated, or 
ordered-and with great precision. 
The comprehensive reach and uniformity of the price system 
has made capitalism the most ordered society ever. In no prior ep- 
och have numbers been so extensively and consistently used to de- 
scribe, organize, and shape human behavior. Prices enable entirely 
new ways of re-ordering society. What previously required military 
conquest now can be done through currency devaluation; what 
once necessitated religious conversion today takes a mere shuffle 
of a few computer records we call portfolio investment. Further- 
more, the highly malleable nature of prices-i.e., their remarkable 
ability to go up and down-makes capitalism by far the most dynam- 
ic of all historical orders. And, indeed, in capitalism change itself 
has become the key moment of order. 
The Pattern of Order 
Now, price is merely the unit with which capitalism is ordered. 
The actual pattern of order-namely, the way in which prices are 
structured relative to one another-is governed by the process of 
capitalization, that is, by the discounting into present value of ex- 
pected future earnings. Capitalization is the central institution and 
key logic of the capitalist nomos. It is the "generative order," to use 
David Bohm's term, through which the capitalist order, denominat- 
ed in prices, is created and recreated, negotiated and imposed. 
Under the price system, the accumulation of capital occurs 
through capitalization. The form of capital is the money value of 
an asset. In this sense, capital is finance, and only finance.13 Now, as 
'"apitalists can own production facilities, retail chains, or banks, but that does 
not make their capital "productive," "con~mercial," or "financial." As we argue below, 
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we have already seen, the monetary magnitude of capital cannot be 
related to the "quantities" of machines, productivity, labor, or util- 
ity. To recap, contrary to conventional theory, these are pseudo- 
quantities; they do not have a clear meaning and hence they cannot 
be examined directly or indirectly; they cannot be reduced to uni- 
versal units and therefore cannot be aggregated; and capitalists 
neither know nor care what they are, so they cannot be used to ex- 
plain the magnitude of capital. 
This theoretical mismatch is evident, if only intuitively, in every- 
day reality. Consider Microsoft. In 2003, the company employed 
only 55,000 workers, had very few machines, structures and equip- 
ment worth slightly more than $2 billion (in historical cost), and 
sold a fairly mediocre set of products. Its market capitalization in 
that year was $293 billion. Now contrast this with General Motors. 
In 2003, General Motors had a huge work force of 326,000 em- 
ployees, it owned countless plants and plenty of equipment worth 
over $72 billion, and it boasted a highly complex production proc- 
ess. Its market capitalization in that year was a mere $30 billion.14 
Microsoft's production seems miniscule relative to General Mo- 
tors', yet its value on the market was ten times larger. Even if we 
add to market capitalization the book value of outstanding debt, 
Microsoft's overall worth to its owners and debtors was still dispro- 
portionately large: $312 billion compared to $453 billion for Gen- 
eral Motors. 
Political economists explain such discrepancies in many differ- 
ent ways. One popular method is to attribute the discrepancy to 
"technology," "know-how," or "human capital3'-all mysterious quan- 
ta that nobody can measure and therefore can easily be used to fill 
any gap (in this case, Microsoft's higher capitalization must be due 
to its more ample "human capital" and "higher technology"). But 
sometimes the differences go the other way, with "low tech" com- 
panies enjoying much higher valuations than "high tech" ones. So a 
second solution is to resort either to Hume's classical dichotomy 
between the "real" and "monetary" spheres, or to Marx's distinc- 
tion between "actual" and "fictitious" capital. Finance, we are told, 
although ultimately determined by the reality of means of produc- 
the articles capitalist own relate to their capital only insofar as they bear on power (far 
more on the issue, see Nitzan & Bichler, 2000; Bichler & Nitzan, 2004). 
l4 Data in this and the following paragraph are from Compustat via Wharton 
Research Data Senlice (WRDS). 
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tion, gets "distorted" by the fiction of speculation and other imper- 
fections. It is only when the "bubble" gets deflated, goes the argu- 
ment, that finance is reduced, if only temporarily, to the "true" 
value of the "underlying" capital. 
This "delinking" thesis is wide of the mark. As we shall see 
later, capitalization has a lot to do with production, broadly de- 
fined; but it has nothing to do with the mythical quantities of pro- 
duction. The notion of speculative bubbles that delink finance 
from its true productive value is meaningful only if such "true" 
value exists. But this "true" value is a pseudoquantity. It does not 
exist, and therefore it cannot be "distorted," "misrepresented," "in- 
flated," or "delinked" from. The story is completely different. 
Begin with the process by which market value is determined. 
Most generally, the money magnitude of an asset is a capitalization 
of earnings. It is equal not to the owned material and immaterial 
objects, but to the present value of the earnings the asset is expect- 
ed to generate. The actual computation depends on three basic 
magnitudes: (1) the expected earnings; (2) the risk factor associ- 
ated with those expected earnings; and (3) the normal rate or re- 
turn used to discount the earnings to their present value. A simpli- 
fied expression is illustrated by the following equation:15 
expected earnings 
capitalization = 
risk x normal rate of return 
Expected earnings is not a single number, but an income stream 
that can follow different temporal patterns (discounted accord- 
ingly). Risk refers to the extent to which capitalists believe they can 
predict the course of these earnings; the standard basis for such 
judgment is the temporal variability of earnings, with higher vari- 
ability typically considered more risky. Finally, the normal rate of 
return is what capitalists believe they can get by investing in so- 
called "riskless" assets, such as U.S. government bonds.16 
l5 This simple formula pertains to a perpetuity with no end value. Capitalization 
and expected earnings are measured in dollars (or any other currency), whereas the 
risk factor and the normal rate of return are noted in decimals. 
'"~isklessness" is commonly used to denote the perception of minimum risk, 
not the absence of risk. It is the "benchmark of order," so to speak, the belief that 
there is some minimum level of instability to which capitalist earnings could be 
reduced. Note that risk is a highly contentious concept that is often conflated, erron- 
All three magnitudes, of course, are highly conjectural. They 
depend on conventional facts, but also, and often very much so, on 
the collective outlook of buyers and sellers. The latter outlook is 
certainly prejudiced, biased, and skewed by circumstances, habits, 
and convictions-but it is also a crucial aspect of the capitalist no- 
mos. Capitalization is the basic building block of accumulation, the 
fundamental formula that all capitalists believe in and nearly eve- 
ryone else accepts as "natural." Conjectures and beliefs built into 
it, therefore, become an external, "objective" force. As Thorstein 
Veblen would have put it, they become a force no less real and im- 
posing than any of the so-called "tangible facts." 
This framework tells us where to start looking. Microsoft's capi- 
talization is ten times larger than General Motors' because owners 
expect it to earn ten times more, to have earnings that are ten 
times less risky, or some combination of the two (the normal rate 
of return, being equivalent in both cases, has no impact on the dif- 
ference). 
The same principle holds true for any other asset. The capitali- 
zation logic determines the present value of a worker (the value of 
her mortgaged home, car, and line of credit together being depen- 
dent on her expected lifetime earnings and the risk of her being 
laid off). It determines the present value of a government (the 
amount of its bond issues being dependent on its ability to levy 
taxes and the social risks that come with such levies). And it de- 
termines the present value of any stock of goods (being equal to 
their one-shot resale price, discounted for the time they will be 
sold and the risk that they may not). 
Clearly, then, in order to explain capitalization we need to look 
not backward to the "productive" articles that supposedly make up 
the asset, but forward to what the asset can earn and at what risk. 
Capitalization of Power 
Every social order is created through a certain mixture of co- 
operation and power. In Athenian democracy cooperation was 
paramount; in capitalism, power is the governing principle. The 
primacy of power in capitalism is rooted in the centrality of private 
ownership. "Private" comes from the Latin privatus, meaning re- 
eously, with uncertainty (cf. Thiinen, 1966; Keynes, 1921; 1937; Knight, 1921). We hope 
to develop a power analysis of risk and uncertainty in our future work. 
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stricted, and from privare, which means to deprive. In the words of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "The first man who, having enclosed off a 
piece of land, got the idea of saying 'This is mine' and found peo- 
ple simple [minded] enough to believe him was the true founder of 
civil society" (Rousseau 2001: Part 11). The most important feature 
of private ownership is not to enable those who own, but to disable 
those who do not. Technically, anyone can get into someone else's car 
and drive away, or order the sale of all of Warren Buffet's shares in 
Berkshire Hathaway. The sole purpose of private ownership is to 
prevent the other from doing so. In this sense, private ownership is 
wholly and only an institution of exclusion, and institutional exclu- 
sion is a matter of organized power. Exclusion does not have to be 
exercised. What matters is the right to exclude and the ability to ex- 
act terms for not excluding. These "terms" are the source of accumu- 
lation. 
The actual process of exclusion is qualitative and potentially 
multifaceted; its ultimate evidence, quantitative and uniform. We can 
examine and describe the many individual facets of exclusion, but 
the only way to "aggregate" these qualitatively different facets is by 
examining the distribution of income (earnings) and its temporal 
trajectory (risk). And since both earnings and risk are a matter of 
exclusion and therefore power, it follows that capital, being the 
present value of risk-adjusted earnings, represents the capitalization 
of power. Ultimately, what gets capitalized is the power to order society. 
Further, and crucially, since power and distribution are inherently 
differential, we cannot talk about "absolute" accumulation. Accumu- 
lation is always and everywhere a differential process, a quantita- 
tive representation of the power of owners relative to others- 
others who can exclude plenty, others who can exclude little, and, 
finally, those who can exclude no one and therefore own nothing. 
(The notion of differential accumulation is central to our argu- 
ment, but we need to deal with other issues before returning to it 
in Section VI.) 
Clearly, not every aspect of power in society gets capitalized. It 
is only insofar as power does affect earnings and risk, and only inso- 
far as this impact is considered sufficiently significant and non-transi- 
tory, that the risk-adjusted income and the power behind it get dis- 
counted. In capitalism, though, these prerequisites are remarkably 
inclusive and constantly expanding. In this way, any power arrange- 
ment, institution, and process that systematically affects the flow 
and temporal pattern of earnings is a potential facet of capital. 
Concrete examples include military spending and managed stagfla- 
tion in Israel, apartheid laws and democratization in South Africa, 
the pendulum of inflation and corporate amalgamation in the 
United States, organized crime in Russia and IMF bailouts in Asia, 
and "energy conflicts" and "peace dividends" in the Middle East. 
Other illustrations, pertaining to the more universal processes of 
power, include the struggle over the nature of labor and work, the 
creation of "wants," intellectual property rights, protectionism, or- 
ganized religion, and the systematic use of violence. These proc- 
esses and institutions all bear on earnings and risk; and once their 
impact is discounted by investors, they become capital. 
This encompassing process, the transformation by which capi- 
tal simultaneously "subsumes" and "quantifies" other forms of pow- 
er, is perhaps the broader meaning of capitalist development. Ex- 
amining this development, therefore, requires that we place power 
at the center of analysis, and that we do so from the very start. We 
need to think not of capital and power, but of capital as power. 
Once we accept this requirement, "politics" and "economics" ap- 
pear not as distinct spheres of human activity and consciousness, 
but as an artificial fragmentation that needs to be overcome. 
The way to articulate and historicize the capitalization of power 
is necessarily speculative. In Marxist and neoclassical theories there 
is an "equation," with capital measured in money on the one side, 
and its determinants denominated in abstract labor or utility on 
the other. Both sides of the equation are assumed to be quantita- 
tive and therefore comparable. By contrast, from the viewpoint of 
capital as power the equality is only metaphorical. The financial 
form of capital is quantitative, whereas the institutions and proc- 
esses of power are qualitative. The only way to "equate" them is 
speculatively: we need to tell a convincing story that contrasts the 
quantitative trajectory of accumulation on the one hand with the 
qualitative development of power on the other. This juxtaposition 
is admittedly conjectural-but, then, that is precisely how the quan- 
titative capitalist nomos is conceived, articulated, and imposed by 
the ruling capitalist class on the rest of society. The numerical 
capitalist order is created not objectively from the outside, but in- 
ter-subjectively from the inside, by human beings. As scientists, we 
try to understand how. 
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The fact that this determination is partly speculative is no invita- 
tion for postist charlatans. Arbitrary "narratives" cannot go very far 
here. Since the subject of inquiry is the structured nomos, the pur- 
pose is still to produce a framework that is open to change-yet sys- 
tematic, comprehensive, operational, robust, predictive and, above 
all, true to the democratic principles of proof and refutation. 
The Capitalist Order and Humane Society: An Interpolation 
A crucial note: the study of capitalization does not, and cannot, 
provide a general theory of society. Capitalization is the language of 
dominant capital. It embodies the beliefs, desires, and fears of the 
ruling capitalist class. It tells us how this group views the world, 
how it imposes its will on society, how it tries to mechanize human 
beings. It is the architecture of capitalist power. 
This architecture, though, tells us very little about the human 
beings who are subjected to its power. Of course, the pundits ob- 
serve their "behavior," their "reaction" to capitalist threats, their 
"choice" of capitalist temptations. Yet they know close to nothing 
about their consciousness, awareness, thoughts, intentions, imagi- 
nation, and aspirations. To paraphrase Cornelius Castoriadis, the 
human kind is like a "magma" to us, a smooth surface that moves 
and shifts.'' Most of the time its movements are rather predictable. 
But under the surface lurk autonomous qualities and energies. The 
language of capitalist power can neither describe nor comprehend 
these qualities and energies. It knows nothing about their magni- 
tude and potential. It can never anticipate when and how they will 
erupt. 
Consider that none of the pundits-communist or anticommu- 
nist-foresaw the collapse of the Soviet bloc (although, in retro- 
spect, the victory of liberalism was of course "inevitable"). Simi- 
larly with the May 1968 revolution in France. This was arguably the 
most important revolution of the twentieth century. And yet, even 
a few days before its explosion, no sociologist-conservative or 
radical-had a clue of what was coming (Paris: May, 1968, 1986; 
Orr, 2003). The story repeats itself with the first Palestinian Inti- 
fada that started in 1987. The uprising took everyone by surprise, 
l7 Castoriadis (1987: ch. 7 )  develops the ontology of the magmas. 
including the critical orientalists and the orthodox PLO establish- 
ment. The list goes on. 
These revolutionary instances cannot be easily theorized, and 
for a good reason. They are rooted in the original spark of free hu- 
man creativity. Originality and creativity cannot be modeled or re- 
duced to historical laws of motion. They cannot be systematically 
predicted. They do not follow a clear pattern. They are unique. 
Karl Marx, the first to investigate the dynamic architecture of 
capitalism, tried to fuse the two movements of power and resis- 
tance to power into a single language. For him, the power of capi- 
talists to accumulate and the political struggle of workers against 
that power could both be derived from and analyzed by one basic 
logic: the labor theory of value. 
In our view, this fusion is impossible to achieve. It is impossible 
to impose the logic of labor (and of human activity in general) on 
capitalists. We cannot denominate the pecuniary architecture of 
capitalization in homogenous units of abstract labor. Capitalization 
and productivity/creativity are two distinct processes, each with its 
own separate logic. The destructive clash of these two processes is 
the engine of the capitalist dialectic, but the dialectic itself cannot 
be understood with one common language. 
Instead, we prefer to imagine two general entities. The first en- 
tity is the capitalist order, whose pattern is imposed on society. The 
gyrations and development of this order can be subjected to a sys- 
tematic, quantitative theory of power. The second entity is a stealth 
humane society. This society exists mostly as an unknown potential. 
Usually it is dormant and therefore invisible. Occasionally, though, 
it erupts, often without warning, to challenge and sometimes threat- 
en the institutions of capitalist power. These eruptions-and their 
consequences-do not follow a pre-set pattern. They cannot be sys- 
tematically theorized. 
For this reason, we do not pretend to offer a general theory of 
capitalist society. We limit ourselves to the study of the capitalist or- 
der only, the order of those who rule. To rule means to see the 
world from a singular viewpoint, to be locked into a unitary logic, 
to be subservient to your own architecture of power. Dominant capL 
ital cannot deviate from the boundaries of this architecture, even if 
it wants to. Its individual members are forced to accept the very 
logic they impose on the rest of humanity. And the more effective 
they are in imposing that logic, the more predictable they them- 
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selves become. This is why their world could be theorized and to 
some extent predicted. 
Over the past century, the power logic of capitalism has been 
incarnated in the process of differential capitalization; that is to 
say, in the belief that there is a "normal rate of return" and that 
capitalists are obliged to "beat" it. This is the gist of the new capi- 
talist cosmology. Instead of the Holy Scriptures, we now have the 
universal language of business accounting and corporate finance. 
The power of God, once vested in priest and king, now reveals it- 
self as the power of Capital vested in the "investor." 
And as the capitalization of power spreads and penetrates, the 
world seems increasingly "deterministic." The determinism of capi- 
talization is now the "natural state of things," the benchmark 
against which one can estimate "deviations," "distortions," "risk," 
and "return." It is a logic that looks unquestionable to those who 
rule and omnipotent to those who are being ruled. 
But this determinism of capitalization has nothing to do with 
"laws of nature," or the "inevitable" progression of history. It is the 
determinism of the ruling class, and only of the ruling class. It works 
only insofar as the ruling class rules. Admittedly, that happens 
most of the time. However, human beings do have the capacity to 
understand the fictitious nature of this "determinism." And when 
they realize that the "rules" are imposed on them by other human 
beings, determinism disappears, replaced-if only for a historical 
instant-by the humane promise of autonomy-democracy-philoso- 
P ~ Y .  
V. PRODUCTION AND STATE 
Accumulation and Production 
Clearly, as an encompassing power process, accumulation can- 
not be exclusively a matter of production. That is not to say, how- 
ever, that that production does not matter for accumulation. Far 
from it. Production-understood loosely as the organization of la- 
bor for the conversion of energy/matter into useful (and harmful) 
articles-is a central facet of social power under capitalism. This 
power bears on both earnings and risk, and therefore significantly 
affects the course of accumulation. 
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However, the link between production and accumulation is 
rather different from what conventional theory will have us be- 
lieve. Neoclassicists and Marxists both tend to think of the two 
processes as closely related if not synonymous. The logic is simple: 
the higher the growth, the larger the potential for plowing back 
productive resources into investment, and the greater the invest- 
ment, the faster the accumulation. When the economy booms, 
goes the conventional creed, so does capitalism. When growth fal- 
ters, accumulation suffers. 
As should be clear by now, strictly speaking this logic is mean- 
ingful only insofar as the inputs, the outputs, and the capital goods 
are all made of the same universal units (abstract labor or utility). 
Otherwise, there could be no quantitative link between them and 
the logic becomes meaningless. But even if we could somehow 
proxy the growth process-for instance, by using as rough indica- 
tors employment, unemployment, or the expenditure of energy- 
once we accept that capital itself represents not material artifacts 
but the capitalization of power, there is no longer any reason for its 
accumulation to be positively related to growth. 
And indeed, in reality the link between accumulation and 
growth (as proxied by standard neoclassical accounting) is nonlin- 
ear and can be positive as well as negative. To explain why, consid- 
er the following extremes. A capitalist society whose resources are 
entirely idle obviously will generate no profit. But a capitalism 
whose resources are fully and permanently employed is equally 
problematic-at least for the capitalists. This latter society may gen- 
erate plenty of goods and services, but it also leaves capitalists with 
no discretion and hence makes them redundant. Since capitalists 
in this hypothetical society have to maintain full employment, by 
definition, they lose their ability to exclude; with no exclusion 
there is no power; and with no power there are no earnings. For 
this reason, the "ideal," Goldilocks state of capitalist societies is 
some measure of unemployment and undercapacity utilization. 
The Goldilocks principle receives a rather stark confirmation 
from the recent history of the United States, illustrated in figure 1. 
The chart contrasts the level of unemployment on the horizontal 
axis (inverted scale), with the national income share of capitalist in- 
come (profit and rent) on the vertical axis. The relationship is 
clearly nonlinear. Very high unemployment (during the Great De- 
pression) and very low unemployment (in the postwar welfare 
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state) were bad for business. Some unemployment-specifically 5- 
8%-was very good for business. At this rate of unemployment the 
share of business in national income was the greatest. Fittingly, 
economists have come to describe this range as the "natural rate of 
unemployment." 
Figure 1 
Unemployment and Capital Income in the United States 
Unemployment (%) 
Note: Series are smoothed as three-year moving averages. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: 
INTNETAMISC for interest; ZBECON for corporate profit; YN for national 
income; RUC for unemployment). 
Marx himself was clearly aware that unemployment and reces- 
sion were means of power in the hands of the capitalist class, in 
that they helped reduce wages and discipline workers. But al- 
though expedient in the class struggle, these measures undermined 
growth and expanded reproduction, reduced the amount of sur- 
plus value, and therefore hindered accumulation according to his 
theory. It was only with Thorstein Veblen that we get the first sys- 
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tematic recognition of power as the basis of capital: a theory of ac- 
cumulation rooted not in growth, but in "strategic sabotage"; the 
argument that capital represents not the ability to produce, but the 
right to "incapacitate"; and the notion that without this "conscious 
withdrawal of efficiency," as Veblen colorfully puts it, there could 
be no profit to begin with and therefore no accumulation at all (cf. 
1975; 1961a; 1961b; 1967). 
The development of capitalism before and after Veblen's death 
seems to confirm his claims. Whenever population expands faster 
than productive capacity (roughly proxied), rapid growth usually 
does not compromise the power of capitalists and therefore does 
not hinder their earnings. This was the situation in the United 
States until the 1890's and in East Asia until the early 1980's. How- 
ever, when productive capacity starts to expand "too fast" relative 
to population growth, capitalists are forced to become vigilant lest 
they lose their right to incapacitate. And indeed, since the early 
1900's, with U.S. population growth slowing considerably and pro- 
ductivity accelerating, "business as usual" in that country was ac- 
companied by an average unemployment rate of 7% (5.7% without 
the Great Depression). The same power logic kicks in elsewhere 
when similar conditions emerge. In both Japan of the late 1980's 
and East Asia of the late 1990's, the combination of declining pop- 
ulation growth on the one hand and fiercely competitive expan- 
sion of productive capacity on the other led to a massive decumula- 
tion of capital. By contrast, in Russia of the 1990's, a huge drop in 
industrial production (70% according to the IMF), orchestrated by 
a new and fairly cohesive class of capitalist oligarchs, enabled the 
accumulation of massive fortunes. In all cases, production matter- 
ed a great deal, sometimes positively, at other times negatively. The 
only way to understand the difference is to look at power. 
Capital and State 
One of the key hurdles in developing a power theory of accu- 
mulation is the habit of separating state from capital. In this sepa- 
ration, capital, denominated in utils or abstract labor, is associated 
with the "stern laws" of consumption and production, whereas the 
state is articulated in the "voluntarist" terms of command and pow- 
er. From the beginning, then, power is seen to lie within the state. 
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Power could be related or unrelated to accumulation, but the two 
concepts themselves, by definition, are inherently distinct. 
This distinction has become problematic, even for mainstream 
scholars. During the 1970's, when statism was riding high in the 
halls of academia, Robert Gilpin (1975) distinguished states and 
markets (i.e., capital) based on their goals.'8 The former, he said, 
was seeking power, the latter wealth. By the late 1980's, though, 
when governments no longer seemed omnipotent, he changed his 
mind, arguing that states and markets (read capital) shared the 
dual goal of power and wealth, and that the difference between 
them lay chiefly in the means they used to achieve this goal 
(Gilpin, 1987). Of course, although markets (meaning capital) could 
seek power, the state, by virtue of its monopoly over organized vio- 
lence, was still paramount. 
Marxists have developed a far more nuanced analysis of this in- 
teraction.lg Most tend to agree that the capitalist state, by necessity, 
has a pro-capitalist bias. Beyond this point, however, there is signif- 
icant disagreement. One area of contention is the extent to which 
state officials are "autonomous" from the overall "logic" of accu- 
mulation, as well as from pressures exerted by particular interest 
groups. Another is whether the state is "developmental" or "preda- 
tory" (similarly to capital, which could be "productive" and useful, 
or "speculative" and wasteful). These characterizations, though, are 
largely static; the really interesting question concerns the way in 
which the nature of state and capital has changed over time. 
This question has been addressed by Giovanni Arrighi and others 
working with him (Arrighi, 1993; Arrighi & Silver, 1999). Examin- 
ing the intertwined evolution of state and capital from the Ve- 
netian city-states till the present, they argued that power has gradu- 
ally shifted from organizations based on territory, primarily the 
state, to ones with access to resources, mainly capital. The shift itself 
was highly dialectical, with a basic "contradictory dependency" 
running between the two entities. Business agencies, because of 
their nonterritorial nature, have grown "ever more dependent on, 
lH The literature on state and society often substitutes "market" for "capital," and 
then goes on to imply that the "market" can have a goal, as if it were a purposeful 
organization or simply a fetish. 
l g  For a wide ranging critical analysis of capitalist state theory, see Jessop (1990). 
For a shorter review, see Das (1996). 
NEW IMPERIALISM O R  NEW CAPITALISM? 35 
but also ever more subversive of, the power of the hegemonic 
state" (Arrighi, Barr & Hisaeda, 1999: 98). 
This long historical experience of contradictory dependency, 
Arrighi et al. argued, could be useful in understanding epochal 
leaps in the underlying nature of both state and capital. Initially, a 
new hegemonic state would typically support and promote its own 
business institutions. However, sooner or later the hegemon's pow- 
er and the monopolistic profit of its companies would begin at- 
tracting outside contenders, as well as generating internal inequi- 
ties and strife. In parallel, business concerns seeking to break their 
spatial barriers would increasingly subvert the very territorial 
power on which they rely. 
Historically, the consequence of these mounting contradictions 
was global instability and, eventually, systemic chaos. The resolution 
of such systemic chaos, at least so far, always involved the emergence 
of a new hegemon-although, according to Arrighi, that latter as- 
pect was less important. The more crucial feature of the transition 
was the emergence of a qualitatively new state-business formation, 
one which helped overcome the earlier contradictions, and which, 
through successive transformations, gradually worked to shift the 
locus of power from territoriality to accumulation. 
The argument is intriguing, and certainly it takes us further 
than most accounts in trying to understand the historical interac- 
tion of state and capital. And yet, even here, the duality persists. 
State and capital, although constantly changing through mutual in- 
teraction, still are seen as fundamentally distinct, and it is this basic 
distinction that we need to rethink. The question is twofold. First, 
does the state merely "affect" capital, or can we think of the state 
itself as being a facet of capital? And, secondly, has capital itself be- 
come a form of state? We consider these two aspects in turn. 
The State in Capital 
The first to suggest that the state was integral to capital was no 
other than Karl Marx. In general, Marx emphasized the primacy of 
production in the emergence and development of capitalism. But, 
then, toward the end of his first volume of Capital, in a section ti- 
tled "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist," we find a strikingly dif- 
ferent interpretation. In contrast to his otherwise bottom-up view, 
in which the state emerges to give an already-developed capitalism 
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its universal form, here he offers a top-down explanation, with ac- 
cumulation seen as emerging from within the state. The genesis of 
capitalism, Marx writes in this section, is primitive accumulation, 
and primitive accumulation is largely the working of the state: 
The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute 
themselves now, more or less in chronological order, parti- 
cularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. 
In England at end of the 17th century, they arrive at a sys- 
tematic combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, 
the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These 
methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial 
system. But they all employ the power of the State, the concen- 
trated and organized force of society, to hasten, hothouse 
fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode 
of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the 
transition. Force is the midwife of every old society preg- 
nant with a new one. It is itself economic power (Marx, 1909: I, 
823-24, emphases added). 
Within this constellation, Marx further identifies the formative 
role of credit, particularly public debt: 
National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state-whether des- 
potic, constitutional or republican-marked with its stamp 
the capitalist era. . . . Public credit becomes the credo of 
capital (1909: I, 827). 
In short, the capitalist state, at least according to what Marx tells us 
here, is neither a historical latecomer, nor an added complication 
to an otherwise pure notion of capital. Instead, it is rather an inte- 
gral aspect of accumulation, and was so from the very start. 
Taking this insight one step further, we could argue that the 
two institutions-state and capital-may be better viewed not sepa- 
rately, but as manifestations of the same power process. Initially, 
their "fusion" was manifested in government bonds: the first system- 
atic capitalization of power, namely, the power of government to tax. 
And since this power was backed by institutionalized force, the gov- 
ernment bond came to represent a share in the organized violence of 
Taken in and of themselves, taxation and the organized vio- 
lence behind it are of course ancient, going back to the early use of 
armies to collect agricultural tribute." Subsequently, taxation was 
legitimized in custom and law, so that the use of naked force be- 
came less necessary. But it was only with the emergence of capital- 
ism that this power was routinely packaged as a financial asset, dis- 
counted as vendible bonds on the open market. 
The origin of this capital-state "bondage" is not hard to iden- 
tify. The intensification of military conflict, initially in the Italian 
city-states of the fifteenth century and, later, with the emergence of 
the Westphalian state system in the seventeenth century; the grow- 
ing mechanization of warfare; and, finally, the substitution of hired 
armies for feudal serfs-together made "cash flow" a burning issue 
for state rulers. These rulers could, of course, get the money 
through taxation; but tax collection was a lengthy process, whereas 
the demands of warfare were urgent. In today's language, we would 
say that these rulers were strategically solvent but tactically illiquid. 
The solution was to turn to hautefinance with its easily accessible 
stash of money, and as the arrangement proliferated the nature of 
power was transformed. Instead of the rigid feudal structure of 
multiple "protections," there emerged the anonymous and highly 
flexible bourgeois "bond" of capital and state. 
There is in fact nothing very "primitive" about primitive accu- 
mulation. Indeed, with time, the capital-state symbiosis has only 
grown stronger. The government bond market has become the 
heart of modern finance. It provides the biggest and most liquid 
security market; it offers a vehicle for both fiscal and monetary 
policy; and it reflects, through its benchmark yield, the universal 
normal rate of return. But the capitalization of state power has 
gone much farther than that. Governments have numerous powers 
other than taxation-including military spending, subsidies, indus- 
trial policies, war making, tariffs, protection of private property, 
patents and copyrights, propaganda, labor laws, macroeconomic 
policies, and policing, to name a few-and these powers all bear on 
- - - - 
20 For a comprehensive Weberian analysis of the rise of the modern state and its 
dual anchor in war and taxation, see Tilly (1975) and Tilly & Blockmans (1994). 
Although state revenues are no longer collected in kind, the fiscal year still 
starts in April, to remind us of springtime tax expeditions in antiquity. 
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the differential level and temporal pattern of capitalist income. In 
fact, it is hard to think of a single aspect of the modern state that 
does not bear on the distribution of income in general and of capi- 
talist income in particular, just as it is difficult to find a single cor- 
poration whose differential earnings are not affected by state 
power. 
Given that these power features of the state all influence differ- 
ential capitalist earnings and risk, they are discounted, if only im- 
plicitly, into corporate stock and bond prices. In other words, a sig- 
nificant proportion of all private property is, in  fact, a "capitalization of 
the state." The precise magnitude of this proportion cannot be de- 
termined, of course; but that inability itself is an indication of how 
inseparable the two institutions have become. 
A few examples should illustrate this symbiosis. Consider Mi- 
crosoft. It does not matter whether Microsoft engineers "produce" 
its software from scratch or "borrow" it entirely from others, grat- 
is. The owners of Microsoft can profit differentially from this soft- 
ware only insofar as they can prevent others from using it without 
pay. This prevention depends on the existence and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights; that is, on the extent to which Micro- 
soft can harness the state to its own end. Remove this ability and in 
no  time you will see Microsoft's earnings and capitalization con- 
verge on the number zero. 
Similarly with so-called financial intermediaries such as Deut- 
sche Bank. The differential earnings of this group depend, among 
other things, on interest rate differentials and credit volumes-both 
of which emerge from a complex power interplay of government 
policy, cooperation and conflict among the leading financial inter- 
mediaries, the relative power of borrowers, and the ebb and flow 
of risk perceptions. The state is deeply "discounted" at every step 
of the way, even if we cannot separate it from the other aspects of 
power. 
Or consider DaimlerChrysler. The level and pattern of its dif- 
ferential earnings depend on its tacit and open collusion with the 
other seven auto titans. They also depend on the highway system 
provided by governments and the availability of alternative public 
transportation; they depend on environmental regulation or lack 
thereof; they depend on the ups and downs in the price of oil and 
hence on the politics of the Middle East; they depend on tax ar- 
rangements with various governments and on the ability to legally 
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use transfer pricing (intra-firm imputations of prices and costs de- 
signed to minimize taxes); they depend on a sophisticated propa- 
ganda war that creates wants and shapes desires; they depend on 
the relative strength of DaimlerChrysler's labor unions; and so on 
and on. DaimlerChrysler's profits also hinge on its huge credit op- 
erations, and therefore on monetary policy; and they depend 011 
the company's military business, and therefore on the global poli- 
tics of armament budgets and the threat-real or imaginary-of in- 
ter- and intrastate conflict. 
A final example-the oil companies. As we shall see later, over 
the past 30 years changes in the relative profits of these companies 
have had little to do with variations in the production of oil-and 
almost everything to do with variations in the price of oil. And the 
relative price of oil in turn has had little to do with utility through 
supply and demand or abstract labor through production-and eve- 
rything to do with the global political economy in general and the 
political economy of the Middle East in particular. So here, too, 
profit is a matter of politics, which means that assets partly capital- 
ize state power. 
The conclusion then is pretty clear. If capital is a material sub- 
stance, then the most we can say is that the state does or does not 
"affect" its accumulation. But if assets represent capitalized power, 
then capital must be seen as incorporating within it features of state 
power; in other words, that the state is partly a n  aspect of capital. 
The Capitalist State 
The other side of the coin is the extent to which the state is 
"conditioned" by capital. Few people would deny the existence of 
state organs-namely the government, the judiciary, the civil serv- 
ice, the police, and army. The existence of these organizations is 
hardly in dispute. What is far less obvious is the logic that lies be- 
hind them. Opinions on this question vary widely. At one extreme 
we have the realist position, according to which the state, repre- 
sented by its "officials," seeks to defend the "national interest" 
against the interest of other nations. At the other extreme, we have 
the structuralist Marxist position that sees the state, in the "last in- 
stance," as being subservient to the "logic of accumulation." And 
both views ring true. There is little doubt that George W. Bush and 
his administration believe that they represent the "national inter- 
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est" of the United States. It is also fairly obvious that this same ad- 
ministration, despite its considerable leeway, cannot deviate too 
much from the underlying "dictates" of profit and accumulation. 
And here lies the problem: as stated, both views are in fact mu- 
tually consistent. How do we rank them? Did the United States at- 
tack Iraq in 2003 to serve its vital national interests? To protect the 
capitalist order? Both? Which is the more important? Can we even 
tell them apart? Similarly, how do we trace the changing signifi- 
cance of each of these distinct logics? Considering the past 50 
years, could we say, for example, that the national interest has 
grown less imposing relative to the logic of accumulation, or was it 
the other way around? Perhaps the underlying logics of the nation- 
al interest and accumulation have both changed? 
If we think of the two key power institutions of our society as 
capital and state, and of the two key power organizations as the 
corporation and the government apparatus, the question that we 
need to address is their respective boundaries: to what extent are 
they distinct, how far do they overlap, and how does their symbi- 
osis develop over time? 
These, undoubtedly, are big questions. To answer them, we 
have to take the following steps. First, we need to specify clearly the 
"logic of state power," and the "logic of accumulation," including 
the categories and units in which they are articulated and ob- 
served. Secondly, we need to identify conflicts between these log- 
ics. And, thirdly, we need to examine how these conflicts pan out 
comparatively and historically. Based on such investigation, we can 
then choose the logic that gives the most consistent, robust, and 
predictive picture. Clearly, so far the debate has not taken this 
route. Worse still, it seems that both sides-the realists and the 
structural Marxists-have preferred to frame their positions in ir- 
refutable terms. 
Stephen Krasner, an advocate of the realist view, interprets the 
national interest not as the sum of individual interests, but rather 
as the overall interest of the nation. In his words, it is not the "util- 
ity of the community" that matters, but the "utility for the commu- 
nity" as determined by its central decision makers (Krasner, 1978: 
12, emphases in the original). However, it is not always clear who 
the "decision makers" are, and that they in fact agree on what consti- 
tutes the "national interest." So, in practice, it is up to the research- 
er-Krasner in this case-to make the decision for them. And the 
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way this interest is phrased is often so loose that it can be made 
consistent with virtually any line of action. For example, according 
to this template, the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq was moti- 
vated (depending on the theorist) by the quest for raw materials, 
by the need to spread capitalist ideology, by the desire to tame the 
barbarians, by the aspiration to thwart Europe and Asia, by the de- 
sire to have George W. Bush reelected, or simply by a miscalcula- 
tion-all in the name of the national interest. Go prove otherwise. 
Unfortunately, structural Marxists do not always fare much bet- 
ter in specifying the logic of accumulation and the interest of capi- 
talists, let alone in assessing the degree to which this logic and in- 
terest dominate the state. In the 1960's, the welfare state served the 
long-term interest of capitalism; in the 1980's, the welfare state's 
demise better served that same interest. In the 1980's and 1990's, 
capitalists wanted a new world order of peace; now they suddenly 
want Empire. In the 1970's and 1980's the U.S. government tried to 
serve its "own" capitalists by conspiring with OPEC to raise oil 
prices; in the early 2000's it tried to cater to their "global" interests 
by invading the Middle East in order to lower oil prices. These 
claims may or may not be true. But their validity can be judged 
only if we first specify exactly what we mean by the "interest of capi- 
talists" and the "logic of accumulation." Only then can we begin to 
judge whether state organizations are autonomous or subservient 
to these interests, or perhaps somewhere in between. 
The remainder of this article outlines the logic of capitalism 
and the interests of the dominant owners as we see them. We then 
illustrate some key features of the historical development of capital 
accumulation. The quantitative patterns that we outline delineate 
the boundaries of capitalist politics. These boundaries point to the 
central political processes, broadly defined, that determine the 
course of accumulation. They also provide a basis for assessing, if 
only tentatively, the extent to which state policies have been "dis- 
counted" into capital on the one hand and the degree to which the 
logic of capital itself has become a "form of state" on the other. 
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VI. DIFFERENTIAL ACCUMULATION AND 
DOMINANT CAPITAL 
Every power society has its own hierarchical system of ranking, 
and capitalism's is by far the most universal, flexible, and encom- 
passing. With capital viewed as a capitalization of power, the logic 
of accumulation is inherently differential. A stock or a bond is a 
power claim over the social process. Its relative quantity, measured 
as a ratio of money values, represents the proportionate ability of 
the owners to control and shape this process for their own aims. 
And since this power, by definition, is exclusionary, it is only rele- 
vant relative to the power of other owners. Microsoft's capitaliza- 
tion being $293 billion is meaningless. But this capitalization being 
ten times larger than GM's and a million times larger than a well- 
off software analyst gives us a clear reading of Microsoft's relative 
power. For this reason, capitalists seek not absolute accumulation, 
but dqferential accumulation. They want not more purchasing power 
or more machines, bur to see their assets grow faster than the av- 
erage. They want to augment their ability to exclude and redistrib- 
ute, and the evidence for this ability is differential asset growth. 
For any capitalist or group of capitalists, the rate of differential 
accumulation (DA)  can be provisionally defined as:'2 
DA =growth rate of assets - growth rate of the average asset 
And since assets represent the discounted value of risk-adjusted 
earnings, this definition can be approximated as: 
DA = (growth rate of expected earnings - growth rate of average 
expected earnings) 
- (growth rate of risk - growth rate of average risk) 
We can further simplify this expression by noting that, over the 
longer haul, earning expectations tend to oscillate around the path 
of actual earnings, so that: 
DA - (growth rate of earnings - growth rate of average earnings) 
- (growth rate of risk - growth rate of average risk) 
All in all, then, the higher the differential earnings and the lower 
the differential risk, the greater the rate of differential accumula- 
- - 
22 A technical note: for the sake of presentation, the equations refer to instantane- 
ous rates of growth. 
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tion. And the greater the rate of differential accumulation, the 
greater the increase in relative social power. 
Obviously, not all capitalists can achieve differential accumula- 
tion. If some accumulate differentially, there must be others who de- 
cumulate differentially. For this reason, we cannot treat all capital as 
inherently similar ("capital in general" or "many capitals in competi- 
tion"). From the start, we must identify the leading differential accu- 
mulators whose capital grows the fastest. This group is historically 
determined. Usually, it consists of the owners and top executives of 
the largest corporations at the core of the political economy (as well 
as smaller contenders whose power is rapidly rising). We label this 
group dominant capital. The fact that this group generally succeeds 
in achieving differential accumulation on the one hand, and its intri- 
cate involvement in the central power processes of government, the 
law, ideology, mass persuasion, international organizations, produc- 
tion, and consumption on the other, are really two sides of the same 
process. Dominant capital, by its very nature, must become increas- 
ingly fused-although never entirely synonymous-with the ruling 
class in contemporary capitalism. 
The extent to which dominant capital is able to shape the social 
process is imprinted on the nomos of capitalist accounting. Broadly, 
this ability is reflected in the combined share of interest and profit 
in overall income (earnings), as well as in the variability of that 
share (risk). In the United States, the path of both indicators, illus- 
trated in figure 2, suggests the growing consolidation of capitalist 
power. First, the share of capital in national income has trended up 
systematically-from an average of less than 12% in the 1930's to 
nearly 17% in the 1990's. Secondly-and in open defiance of con- 
ventional finance theory-the variability of the income share of 
capital has actually declined, and steeply.2' All in all, then, capital- 
ists controlled a growing share of the total income stream in the 
United States; and, judging by the declining variability of that 
share, this control has become more predictable and less risky. 
23 In terms of standardized relative deviations from trend, measured as a twenty- 
year moving average, the variability of the income share of capital declined by two- 
thirds from the 1930's to the mid-19601s, and remained relatively stable thereafter. 
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Figure 2 
Capital Income in the United States 
- - -  
.- 
.- 
\-- Pretax Corporate Profit * 
. -
.- and Net Interest 
as a percent of 
National Income 
* Including capital consumption allowance and inventory valuation adjust- 
ment. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: 
INTNETAMISC for interest; ZBECON for corporate profit; YN for national 
income). 
As emphasized, underlying the aggregate picture is the growing 
power of dominant capital, measured by its differential accumula- 
tion. Figure 3 provides two indicators for differential accumulation. 
The proxy for dominant capital here is the Fortune 500 group of 
companies. The top series in the chart shows the ratio between the 
net profit of a typical Fortune 500 firm and the annual average wage 
rate in the private sector. The bottom series shows the ratio between 
the net profit of a typical Fortune 500 firm and the average net 
profit per firm in the corporate sector. (These indicators are biased 
in two ways. First, until 1993, the Fortune 500 proxy included only 
firms whose largest line of business in terms of sales was manufac- 
turing and/or mining, and therefore did not represent the full spec- 
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trum of dominant capital. From 1994 onward the universe has been 
expanded to include all firms. Secondly, capitalist income for both 
the Fortune 500 and the average corporation does not include in- 
terest income earned by corporate creditors and bondholders.) 
Figure 3 
Differential Accumulation in the United States 
: log scale Trend growth rate: 
2.7% per annum 
Net Profit to Wage Rate Ratio: 
Fortune 500 1 Wage Rate . - . - 
. - 
. - - : :.-- 
Trend 
growth rate: 
4.6% 
per annum 
Net Profit Ratio: 
Fortune 500 I Average U.S. Firm 
Note: Net profit for the average U.S. firm is total after tax profit divided by the 
number of corporate tax returns. The annual wage rate is based 011 total pri- 
vate average hourly earnings. Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only in- 
dustrial corporations (firms deriving at least half their sales revenues from 
manufacturing and/or mining). In 1994, the list was expanded to include all 
corporations. For 1992-93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported with- 
out SFAS 106 special charges. 
Source: Fortune; U.S. Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Department of Commerce 
through Global Insight (series codes: ZA for profit after tax without IVA and 
CCADJ; AHEEAP for total private average hourly earnings). 
Both series show a persistent exponential uptrend (note the log- 
arithmic scale). In the early 1950's, a typical dominant capital firm 
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commanded a profit stream roughly 5,000 times the income of an 
average worker; in the late 1990's, the comparable figure was 
25,000, a fivefold increase. Similarly with differential accumulation 
relative to other firms. In the early 1950's, the net profit of a For- 
tune 500 firm was 500 times bigger than the U.S. average; in the 
late 1990's, the multiple was around 7,000, a fourteen-fold increase. 
Unlike with the total income share of capital depicted in figure 2, 
here the increase in differential earnings has been accompanied, 
particularly in the early 1990's and early 2000's, with higher volatil- 
ity (although a more complete analysis that includes interest in- 
, 
come and adjusts for the prevalent accounting fraud of the late 
1990's could modify this conclusion). 
Assuming our power approach to accumulation is correct, these 
indicators suggest that, over the past century, the power logic of 
capital in the United States has significantly solidified (larger in- 
come share and lower variability), and that dominant capital, the 
engine of this process, has grown stronger (although possibly more 
vulnerable to higher risk). How has this increase in capitalist power 
been achieved? 
Regimes of Dzfferential Accumulation 
Differential accumulation is a broad political process and, as 
such, could be examined in various ways. Here, we look at it from 
the viewpoint of the capitalist corporation. Analytically, there are 
two methods of achieving differential accumulation: breadth and 
depth. To illustrate the meaning of these concepts, begin with the 
dollar level of corporate earnings, written as a product of two com- 
ponents: (i) the "size" of the corporate organization, proxied by 
the number of employees; and (ii) the "elemental power" of that 
organization, measured in dollar earnings per employee.24 Sym- 
bolically, this decomposition could be written as follows: 
earnings = (employment) (earnings / employment) 
Labeling the first brackets breadth and the second depth, we have: 
earnings = breadth depth 
'4 The concept of earnings here refers to profits and/or interest as the case may 
be. 
NEW IMPERIALISM OR NEW CAPITALISM? 47 
This decomposition requires clarification. Despite the obvious 
connotations, our reference here to employment and to earnings 
per employee has little to do with "production." As noted, our con- 
cern is not productivity, utility or labor; it is power. In capitalism, 
power is measured through the differential capitalization of earn- 
ings. By decomposing earnings we can get a sense of how power 
expands and contracts. 
The choice of employment as a measure of organizational size is 
not accidental. Ever since the first power civilizations in the ancient 
river deltas, organizations were measured by "head," or capita. They 
were counted in slaves, soldiers, serfs, religious followers, factory 
workers, and now, more generically, employees. The number of 
heads under one's immediate command-relative to the number of 
heads commanded by others-is indicative of one's power. 
But formal organizational size is merely the first, immediate di- 
mension of power. In the past, rulers were able to use their slaves, 
soldiers, serfs, religious laity, and factory workers to control others, 
far beyond the formal confines of their own organization. And the 
same is true, only many times over, with the broader category of 
employment. Operating through their corporate organization, cap- 
italists are able to extend their indirect power over society as a 
whole. This indirect power takes numerous forms-from the crea- 
tion of loyal and predictable consumers, through the taming of vot- 
ers, to the control of subcontractors, the subjugation of govern- 
ments, the shaping of public policies, the molding of culture and 
ideology, the harnessing of religion, the use of armies and police 
forces, and the crafting of international relations. The relative ef- 
fectiveness of these multiple forms of indirect power becomes crys- 
tallized in the magnitude of differential earnings per employee. 
This latter measure represents the elemental power of the capitalist 
organization, its ability to extend its power beyond its immediate 
size. 
The decomposition of capitalist earnings into employment and 
earnings per employee, although true by definition, is highly useful 
for our purpose. To see why, think about the above equation in rela- 
tive, or differential, terms. A dominant capitalist increases breadth 
in absolute terms by increasing employment; he increases breadth in 
relative terms by increasing differential employment-that is, by in- 
creasing his own employment faster than the average. For example, if 
average employment growth is 5%, and dominant capital expands its 
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labor force by 7%, we say that differential breadth is 2% (the differ- 
ence between the two). 
Following the same logic, to increase depth is to raise earnings 
per employee, and to increase differential depth is to raise earn- 
ings per employee faster than the average. If the average earnings per 
employee grow by 10% and dominant capital achieves 14%, differ- 
ential depth is 4 percent. 
Each of these methods-breadth and depth-can be further sub- 
divided into external and internal avenues, leading to a four-way 
classification illustrated in table 1. 
Table 1 
Regimes of Differential Accumulation 
External Internal 
Breadth Green-field Mergers €3 Acquisitions 
Depth Stagflation Cost-cutting 
External breadth takes place when dominant capital hires new 
workers and creates new (green-field) capacity faster than the aver- 
age. Internal breadth occurs when dominant capital takes over exist- 
ing capacity and workers through mergers and acquisitions; that is, 
by buying other companies. Individually, large firms engage in 
both methods; but as a group, their differential breadth is deter- 
mined almost entirely by the latter. "One capitalist always kills 
many," observed Karl Marx in the nineteenth century (1909: I, 
836). And, indeed, the twentieth-century growth of big business 
was achieved mostly by amalgamation, with large firms buying ex- 
isting capacity rather than building it (see for instance, Scherer & 
Ross, 1990: chs. 3 and 5). 
Internal depth refers to the ability of large firms to increase 
earnings per employee by cutting costs faster than the average. Ex- 
ternal depth denotes the capacity of large firms to do the same by 
increasing prices faster than the average. Again, individually, domi- 
nant capital firms try to do both, sometimes simultaneously. But 
over the longer haul it is mostly the latter method that matters for 
differential depth. Cost cutting, of course, is pursued relentlessly 
by both large and small firms. However, since it is difficult to pre- 
vent others from using new production techniques and from taking 
advantage of cheaper input prices, the net impact of cost cutting is 
mostly to meet the average rather than beat it. Historically, the 
main gains in differential depth have come from dominant capital 
raising its prices faster than the average, a process that at the ag- 
gregate level appears as stagflation. 
Now, to most readers, these claims would seem counterintuitive, 
if not preposterous. As noted, growth often is used as a synonym 
for accumulation, and inflation is considered poisonous for profit. 
Capitalism, goes the conventional creed, abhors stagnation and 
loves price stability. 
Unfortunately, these conventions do not sit well with the facts, 
real or imaginary. The mismatch is largely the result of the theo- 
retical fixation on "material" accumulation already alluded to. If 
we break this fixation and instead think of accumulation as a dif- 
ferential power process, mergers and acquisitions suddenly become 
as important as growth, if not more so, and stagflation, at least un- 
der certain circumstances, turns from foe to friend. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, these two accumulation paths-amalgamation and 
stagflation-have become so paramount that they now appear as 
broad social regimes, each with its own unique characteristics. 
VII. AMALGAMATION AND STAGFLATION 
Growth or Merger? 
There is no denying that green-field growth is a central process 
in capitalism. But as we have seen, the effect of growth on corpo- 
rate earnings is highly nonlinear-and from a certain point, nega- 
tive. The twentieth-century rise to prominence of big business and 
large government helped circumvent the threat of "excessive" 
growth. Gradually, differential accumulation by dominant capital 
has come to depend more and more on corporate merger (internal 
breadth) and less and less on green-field growth (external depth). 
The process is clearly illustrated in figure 4, which shows what 
we call the "Buy-to-Build Ratio" for the United States. This index 
measures, for each year, the ratio between the dollar value of 
mergers and acquisitions and the dollar value put into building 
new factories, or what economists call "real" investment. Note the 
explosive growth of this ratio, plotted on a logarithmic scale. In the 
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late nineteenth century, there was less than one cent's worth of 
mergers and acquisitions for every one dollar of "real" investment. 
Fast-forward another hundred years, and for every one dollar of 
"real" investment there were over two dollars put into mergers. In 
other words, over the entire period mergers have grown roughly 
300 times faster than "real" investment. 
Figure 4 
Corporate Amalgamation in the United States 
L 
: log scale 
1999 
218% 
Buy-to-Build Indicator* 2003 (mergers & acquisitions as a % of 80% 
gross .fixed capital formation) 
0.6% 
L 
Source: Nitzan & Bichler (2002: 82-83). 
Does this process make any sense? From the viewpoint of abso- 
lute accumulation, not really. Mergers do not add more machines, 
more utility, or more abstract labor. They simply reshuffle owner- 
ship. But from the viewpoint of differential accumulation, the proc- 
ess makes a great deal of sense. For dominant capital, "too much" 
green-field investment is disastrous. Simply put, it means the inabil- 
ity to exclude-the other side of which is glut, falling prices, and, 
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eventually, differential decumulation, including the possible disinte- 
gration of the existing grid of power, institutions, and capabilities. 
Clearly, it is much better to buy than to build. Buying helps 
dominant capital kill four birds with one stone: (1) it does not cre- 
ate any new capacity; (2) it expands control; (3) it helps earnings 
grow faster than the average-since, by definition, the average re- 
mains the same; and (4) it reduces risk by making the resulting 
units larger, more diversified, and f ~ ~ r t h e r  intertwined with state or- 
ganizations and processes. 
This focus on merger helps explain the globalization zeal of the 
past twenty years. The chart shows four merger waves. Each of 
these waves occurred within a given corporate universe. (1) The 
monopoly wave of the turn of the century occurred within individ- 
ual industries; (2) the oligopoly wave of the 1920's occurred within 
sectors; (3) the conglomerate wave of the 1960's took place across 
the entire business sector; and (4) the last wave of the 1980's and 
1990's was, by and large, global. 
This historical progression is not without logic. When expand- 
ing through merger, dominant capital eventually takes over every- 
thing worth owning in its original universe. And once it reaches 
that point, the only way to continue merging is to break this origi- 
nal envelope and expand into the next one. This logic explains the 
progression from the industry to the sector to the national border. 
And eventually, when the national scene becomes highly central- 
ized, it explains why there is no choice but to "go global." 
From this perspective, neoliberal globalization-both as an ide- 
ology and as a practice-was a matter not of choice but of necessity: 
Without it, the fourth merger wave could not have happened. Fur- 
thermore, the driving force was not productive integration (al- 
though that could be a consequence), but power. According to 
U.N. data, roughly three-quarters of all direct foreign investment in 
the 1990's occurred through corporate merger (we return to the 
issue of globalization at the end of this secti~n).~'  
25 Note that, on its own, the act of foreign investment-whether portfolio or di- 
rect-consists of nothing more than the creation or alteration of ownership titles. The 
popular perception that direct investment creates new productive capacity, in contrast 
to portfolio investment, which is merely a paper transaction, is simply wrong. In fact, 
both are paper transactions whose only difference is relative size: investments worth 
more than 10% of the target company's equity are commonly classified as direct, 
whereas those worth less are considered portfolio. 
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It should be emphasized here that each "breaking of the enve- 
lope" involves more than a mere change in ownership. Typically, it is 
accompanied by a comprehensive social transformation, including 
changes in ideology, policy, organization, institutions and, of course, 
the emergence of new opposition and the rekindling of counter- 
struggles. Partly for such reasons, merger is not always possible. Fig- 
ure 4 shows that each of the merger waves eventually collapsed. And 
this is where inflation-or external depth-comes into the picture. 
Price Stability or Inflation? 
Inflation has been a permanent feature of twentieth-century 
capitalism. In developed countries such as Great Britain and the' 
United States, prices have risen uninterruptedly (with the Great De- 
pression being the only exception), scoring nearly a 50-fold in- 
crease from 1900 to 2000. In developing countries, the rate of in- 
crease was often much higher. And yet, most political economists, 
whose theories remain informed by the deflationary nineteenth 
century, continue to argue that the phenomenon is largely "mone- 
tary" and therefore "neutral." This insistence is misleading, to put 
it mildly. First, inflation is a major engine of redistribution in capi- 
talism. Secondly, and in open defiance of the stern "laws of supply 
and demand," inflation tends to emerge not with growth, but with 
stagnation; that is, it tends to appear as sta&lation. 
1nfLtion redistributes income in many ways, of which we em- 
phasize two. The first is redistribution from wo'rkers to capitalists. 
As we already saw in figure 3, the profits of U.S.-based dominant 
capital have risen exponentially relative to the wage rate. Figure 5 
shows how this redistribution relates to inflation. The thin series in 
the chart measures the ratio between corporate earnings per share 
(the price of a unit of owned capital) and the average wage rate 
(the price of a unit of owned labor power). When this ratio goes 
up, income is redistributed from workers to capitalists; the oppo- 
site occurs when the series goes down. The thick series in the chart 
shows the annual inflation rate, measured by the wholesale price 
index. 
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Figure 5 
U.S. Inflation and Capital-Labor Distribution 
Corporate Earnings per Share / Wage Rate* - 
(Index, right) 
Wholesale Price Index 
(annual % change, left) 
I 
* Corporate earnings per share are for the SUP 500 Index (ratio of price to 
price/earnings). The wage rate is the average hourly earning in the private sec- 
tor. 
Note: Series are smoothed as three-year moving averages. 
Source: Global Financial Data (series codes: -SPXD for price; SPPECOMW for 
price/earnings); U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics through Global Insight (series codes: AHEEAP for the wage rate; WPINS 
for the wholesale price index). 
The data in the figure go back more than 50 years, so they cer- 
tainly can tell us something about the historical pattern. The correla- 
tion is not very tight-which is to be expected given the many other 
factors involved. But to the extent that there is a rough pattern here 
it suggests that, in general, U.S. inflation has worked in favor of capi- 
talists and against workers. When inflation was up, capitalists tend- 
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ed to gain and workers to lose.?"t should be mentioned, again, that 
the data here do not include corporate interest payments to credi- 
tors and bondholders. These latter payments tend to rise with infla- 
tion, thus further boosting the inflationary redistribution from 
workers to capitalists. 
The second redistribution is from small to large firms, with in- 
flation acting as a mechanism of diffeerential accumulation. This lat- 
ter process is illustrated in figure 6, which, again, pertains to the 
United States. The thin line in the figure shows the ratio between 
the profit markup of the Fortune 500 and the average profit mark- 
up in the business sector as a whole. When this ratio goes up, it 
means that the markup of large firms rises faster (or falls more 
slowly) than the average markup. When the ratio goes down, it 
means that the markup of large firms rises more slowly (or falls 
faster) than the average markup. The thick line denotes the rate of 
inflation. And, again, the correlation here is tightly positive. Infla- 
tion clearly is a mechanism of differential acc~mulat ion.~~ 
So, contrary to what many economists like to tell us, inflation is 
by no means "neutral." On the contrary, it is a very potent engine 
of accumulation. Of course, a rise in prices does not increase the 
"amount" of machines. But accumulation is not about machines; it 
is about increasing capitalist power in general and differential pow- 
er in particular. And here inflation often works wonders. 
This conclusioii naturally leads to the following question: if infla- 
tion is so good for capitalists, why do they oppose it? The short 
Pb Corporate earnings-in this case, profit (nj-is the product of the number of 
units sold (a, the price per unit (P), and the ratio of profit to sales revenues, or the 
markup (k). In order for capitalists to benefit relative to workers, the product of these 
three components has to rise faster than the wage rate ( w ) .  This relative increase can 
occur in many different ways: for instance, if Q and k remain unchanged but P rises 
faster than w ;  if Q remains unaltered and the product P . k increases faster than w ;  
etc. In this framework, the positive correlation in figure 3 means that the higher the 
rate of inflation, the more rapid the combined increase in the three components of 
corporate profit relative to the wage rate (changes in the number of corporate shares 
also affect the ratio in the chart, but these changes are usually small relative to the 
fluctuations of profit and wages). 
'' For the profit markup to rise, firms have to raise their prices faster (or have 
them fall more slowly) than their unit cost (i.e., the cost of labor, materials, interest, 
and taxes). For the markup of large firms to rise relative to the average markup, large 
firms must be able to raise their price-to-cost ratio faster than the average price-to-cost 
ratio. The positive correlation in figure 6 suggests that this ability rises and falls with 
the overall rate of inflation. 
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Figure 6 
U.S. Inflation and Differential Accumulation 
Wholesale Price Index 
(annual % change, left) 
J. 
Ratio of Markups: 
Fortune 500 / Business Sector* - 
(right) 
I I 
* The markup is the percent of net profit in sales. The Fortune 500 markup is 
the percent of after tax profit in sales revenues. The business sector markup is 
computed by dividing total corporate profit after tax, with IVA and CCA (from 
the national income accounts) by total business receipts (from the IRS). The 
Ratio of Markups is given by dividing the Fortune 500 markup by the business 
sector markup. 
Note: Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations 
(firms deriving at least half their sales revenues from manufacturing and/or 
mining). In 1994, the list was expanded to include all corporations. For 1992- 
93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special 
charges. All series are smoothed as three-year moving averages. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: 
ZAADJ for total corporate profit after tax with IVA and CCA; WPINS for the 
wholesale price index); U.S. Internal Revenue Service; Fortune. 
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answer is that they do not always oppose it. The longer answer re- 
quires that we consider the impact of inflation not only on earn- 
ings and redistribution, but also on risk. Inflation certainly is a 
risky business with serious downsides. The main reason for this 
risk is that, contrary to popular belief, over the long run inflation 
tends to appear as stagflation; that is, inflation together with stagna- 
tion. Indeed, we would further argue-although we cannot prove it 
here-that some stagnation in fact is a precondition for inflati~n.~'  
Figure 7 plots the long-term relationship in the United States 
between inflation on the vertical axis and economic growth on 
the horizontal axis. The correlation in the chart is clearly nega- 
tive, not positive, and the United States is hardly an exception in 
this regard. Although many economists prefer not to know it, in 
fact, the same negative long-term relationship is evident in most 
countries (see for instance, Nitzan, 1995). The stagnation that 
tends to come with inflation, along with other aspects of social 
instability, raises risk perceptions, and rising risk is a big negative 
for accumulation. 
Thus, unlike mergers and acquisitions that both boost differen- 
tial earnings and lessen differential risk, inflation is potentially a 
double-edged sword. It tends to raise differential earnings by redis- 
tributing income from workers to capitalists and from small to big 
firms, but the accompanying rise in unemployment and uncertain- 
ty raises risk and can mitigate these differential gains (what matters 
to differential accumulators is not overall, but differential risk-i.e., 
their own risk relative to the average risk). The crucial interplay be- 
tween these two potentially opposing aspects of inflation has re- 
ceived little attention and deserves much further research. None- 
theless, the existence of these opposing impacts serves to suggest 
why large capitalists often endorse inflation-but always half-heart- 
edly and usually when they feel that "there is no alternative." And 
this feeling of no alternative tends to develop when mergers go 
into hibernation. 
28 For more on this issue, see Nitzan & Bichler (2002: ch. 4). 
NEW IMPERIALISM O R  NEW CAPITALISM? 
Figure 7 
United States: Long-Term Inflation and Growth 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
GDP IN CONSTANT PRICES (annual % change) 
* Ratio of GDP in current prices to GDP in constant prices. 
Note: Series are shown as twenty-year moving averages. The smooth curve 
running through the observations is drawn freehand for illustration pur- 
poses. 
Source: Historical data till 1928 are from The Bank Credit Analyst Research 
Group. From 1929 onward, data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce 
through Global Insight (series codes: GDP for GDP; GDP96 for GDP in con- 
stant prices). 
The Pendulum 
The historical relationship between merger and stagflation is 
very interesting and largely unexplored.'~igure 8 describes their 
related patterns for the United States. The top line in the chart is a 
stagflation index. The index is constructed, first, by measuring the 
29 To our knowledge, we are the only ones to have investigated this relationship. 
For an analysis of the process at the global level, see Nitzan (1999; 2001). For a com- 
parative study of South Africa and Israel, see Nitzan & Bichler (2001). 
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standard deviation of inflation from its historic average; then, by 
computing the standard deviation of unemployment from its aver- 
age; and finally by taking the average of the two indices. A zero 
reading on the combined index denotes the average rate of stagfla- 
tion, a high reading indicates above-avera e sta lation, and a low I @  
reading means below-average stagflation. The lower line in the 
figure-our amalgamation index-is the "Buy-to-Build Ratio": the 
ratio between the dollar value of mergers and acquisitions and 
the dollar value of "real" investment from figure 4. 
Several rather remarkable patterns are evident from the chart. 
The first feature is secular. The chart shows that, over the long 
haul, mergers and acquisitions were the path of least resistance. 
Whereas stagflation moved sideways, oscillating around its own 
stable mean, mergers and acquisitions rose exponentially relative to 
green-field investment (note the logarithmic left scale). Conven- 
tional views of accumulation often identify the gradual decelera- 
tion of green-field investment over the past century as an accumu- 
lation crisis. From the viewpoint of capital as power, however, this 
declaration is a sign not of weakness, but of strength. Excessive ca- 
pacity growth is disastrous for capitalist power. It needs to be care- 
fully regulated, and corporate amalgamation, in addition to its di- 
rect contribution to differential accumulation, does precisely that: 
it keeps capacity growth checked at its moderate, Goldilocks range. 
The exponential growth in the "Buy-to-Build Ratio" also helps 
put in context the gradual shift of state policies. While official 
rhetoric in the United States and elsewhere has remained loyal to 
the "national interest" of growth, policy practice has increasingly 
tilted in favor of amalgamation-via deregulation (and re-regula- 
tion in other forms), privatization, subsidies, and tax incentives. 
The second feature in the chart is cyclical. Following the initial 
emergence of big business in the United States in the 1890's, merg- 
er and stagflation have tended to move counter-cyclically, as a mir- 
ror image of each other. Temporary declines in mergers and acqui- 
sitions were typically compensated for by sharp increases in stag- 
flation; and when amalgamation resumed, with dominant capital 
- 
30 The continuous existence of under-utilized capacity and unemployed workers 
means that the United States experienced some measure of stagnation throughout the 
twentieth century. Also, with the exception of the 1930's, there was always some infla- 
tion. Strictly speaking, then, U.S. inflation during that period was always stagflationary. 
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breaking through its existing envelope and into a broader universe, 
stagflation promptly abated. 
Figure 8 
Amalgamation and Stagflation in the United States 
k 
: log scale Stagflation lndex * 
(unemployment plus inflation, right) 
J Amalgamation lndex ** (Buy-to-Build Indicator, left) 
I I I I I O I I I I I I L  
* Computed as the average of: (1) the standardized deviations from average 
of the rate of unemployment, and (2) the standardized deviation from the 
average rate of change of the GDP implicit price deflator. 
** Mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross fixed capital formation. 
The last data point (2004) is our own estimate. 
Note: Series are shown as five-year moving averages (the first four observa- 
tions in each series cover data to that point only). 
Source: The Stagflation Index is computed from data from the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: RUC for the rate of 
unemployment; GDP/GDPR for the GDP implicit price deflator). The Amal- 
gamation Index is from Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: 82-83 (updated to 2004). 
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The very existence of this counter-cyclical pattern is startling, 
even from the viewpoint of capital as power. Our argument in this 
article is that dominant capital is driven by the quest for differen- 
tial accumulation, and that this quest is best served by amalgama- 
tion or stagflation. But amalgamation and stagflation are not laws 
of nature. They are creatures of the nomos. Neither has to happen, 
they do not have to move counter-cyclically, and they do not have 
to augment differential accumulation. In this context, the fact that 
both are orderly phenomena, that they do move counter-cyclically, 
and that their inter-related pattern has sustained continued differ- 
ential accumulation for the past century-is nothing short of re- 
markable. The energy necessary to arrest a society of potentially free 
beings into such a historical straitjacket must be enormous. The fact 
that humanity now marches with this straitjacket on, and so pre- 
dictably, attests the victory of the capitalist nomos. 
The third, related pattern in figure 8 is the progressive tighten- 
ing of the inverse correlation between merger and ~ ta~f l a t ion .~ '  
This progression from looser to tighter correlation may be related 
to the spread and penetration of differential accumulation as a 
central feature of contemporary capitalism. Differential accumula- 
tion by individual capitalists is not new. But it emerged as a domi- 
nant political process only toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
when corporations grew large enough and became sufficiently in- 
tertwined with state organizations to engage in systematic strategic 
sabotage. The process first became important in certain sectors in 
the United States and Europe, from where it subsequently spread 
domestically and internationally. However, the spread was highly 
uneven, and so, despite high capital mobility, the cyclical regimes 
in different sectors and countries initially were disjoined and out of 
step with one another. It was only later-with the gradual prolifera- 
tion and deepening of business principles, conventions, and ideol- 
ogy, with the progressive breaking of sectoral envelopes, and with 
the growing globalization of ownership-that differential accumula- 
tion became the compass of modern capitalism. And therefore it 
was only toward the middle of the twentieth century, when the 
combined effect of these processes began to be felt, that breadth 
" The 25-year moving correlation between the stagflation and amalgamation in- 
dices (with the amalgamation index measured as natural log and expressed as devia- 
tion from its own exponential trend) fell from a +0.09 in 1914 (nearly no correlation), 
to -0.94 in 2003 (nearly perfect negative correlation). 
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and depth grew stylized and more synchronized. By the end of the 
century, the pendulum of breadth and depth has become almost 
predictable-so much so that in 1999 we were able to anticipate 
both the coming end of the neoliberal global merger boom and 
the shift toward conflict-driven stagflation (Nitzan, 1999). 
Taken together, the three key features in figure 8-the growing 
significance of corporate amalgamation as the main engine of dif- 
ferential accumulation; the counter-cyclical movement of amalgama- 
tion and stagflation; and their tightening inverse correlation-can 
help us understand the changing nature of the capitalist nomos. On 
the one hand, these features provide a clear logic for the capitaliza- 
tion of power; they suggest a relatively predictable periodicity for its 
central processes; and they place fairly clear quantitative boundaries 
around these processes. On the other hand, by focusing on the quali- 
tatively distinct socio-political hallmarks of corporate amalgamation 
and stagflation, we can historicize their quantitative patterns. 
Differential Accumulation and the Pattern of Conflict 
Since differential accumulation is a process of social transfor- 
mation, its specific regimes are important for understanding the 
broader nature of institutional and structural change under capi- 
talism. Perhaps the most important of these changes concerns the 
pattern of conflict. Dominant capital struggles to increase its pow- 
er, primarily relative to other capitalists. In breadth this struggle is 
direct; in depth, indirect. 
When expanding through breadth, capitalists fight each other 
over the control of existing and new business organizations. This in- 
tracapitalist struggle is commonly associated with overall growth 
and ongoing institutional change, which in turn partly conceals the 
conflict between capitalists and society at large. By contrast, in 
depth, the intracapitalist struggle is waged over the elemental power 
of business organization; this struggle is mediated through a redistri- 
butional conflict between capitalists and the rest of society. More- 
over, in depth, redistribution thrives on stagflation, not growth. 
Obviously, sustaining such accumulation-through-crisis requires en- 
trenchment, fortified power arrangements, and a greater use of 
force and violence. All in all, then, the social conditions that are 
conducive to breadth are inhospitable for depth, and vice versa. This 
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fact partly explains why breadth and depth, taken as broad regimes, 
tend to move counter-cyclically rather than together." 
At the global level, and seen from the viewpoint of dominant 
capital in the core countries, we can tentatively identify several 
broad phases of differential accumulation whose initially blurred 
contours gradually sharpen into focus: (1) a mixture of breadth 
and depth during the period between the 1890's and 1910's; (2) a 
partial breadth regime during the 1920's; (3) a depth regime in the 
1930's; (4) a breadth regime from the 1940's to the 1960's; ( 5 )  a re- 
turn to depth in the 1970's and early 1980's; (6) the reemergence 
of breadth in the late 1980's and 1990's; and (7) the apparent re- 
turn of depth in the early years of the twenty-first century. Let us 
look at each of these periods more closely. 
The period from the 1890's to the 1910's was one of rapid and 
accelerating economic growth, coupled with relatively low infla- 
tion, and the beginning of corporate transnationalization, particu- 
larly by large U.S.-based companies. Internationally, differential ac- 
cumulation was still cloaked in "statist" clothes, with American and 
European companies often seen as imperial agents as well as pur- 
suers of their own interests. The competitive expansion of these 
companies, however, was largely uncoordinated and soon led to the 
creation of massive "imbalances" between excess productive capac- 
ity and insufficient business sabotage. Left unattended, such imbal- 
ances would have spelled business ruin, so there was growing pres- 
sure to resolve the predicament via depth. And, indeed, as figure 8 
shows, since the mid-1900's U.S. merger activity had collapsed, fol- 
lowed in the 1910's by war in Europe and the spread of stagflation 
around the world. 
The 1920's offered a brief break. In the United States, merger ac- 
tivity soared while stagflation subsided sharply. In Europe, however, 
the reprieve was short and stress signs soon were piling up. Pro- 
tectionist walls, both between and within countries, emerged every- 
where; stagflation spread through a cascade of crises; and before 
long the world had fallen into the Great Depression of the 1930's. 
By that time, the counter-cyclical pattern of breadth and depth 
became more apparent, with declining merger activity accompanied 
12 There has been considerable work on long waves in capitalist development, the 
most famous being that of Ernest Mandel (1995). This work focuses mainly on 
material production and is fundamentally different than our own. 
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by rising ~tagf'lation.~~ The new depth regime was marked by the 
massive use of military force, in which the global power impasse was 
resolved through an all-encompassing world war. This use of vio- 
lence was articulated and justified largely in statist terms: it was a 
war of sovereigns, waged over territory and ideology. But the war 
also proved highly significant for differential accumulation. Most im- 
portantly, it accelerated the relative ascent of U.S.-based corpora- 
tions, as well as the global spread of the normal rate of return. 
After the war, the world again shifted to breadth. The counter- 
cyclical regime pattern was sharpened even further, while the in- 
verse correlation between inflation and growth became increasing- 
ly apparent. On the surface, it looked as if developments during 
that period, that lasted until the end of 1960's, should have under- 
mined breadth. For one, superpower rivalry, decolonization, and 
the nonalignment movement limited the geographical expansion 
of Western dominant capital. In addition, many developing coun- 
tries, previously open to foreign investment, adopted import substi- 
tution policies that favored domestic over foreign companies. 
And yet, for much of the 1950's and 1960's, these barriers on 
breadth were outweighed by two powerful counterforces. The first 
of these was the postwar baby boom that boosted population 
growth. The second was the postwar rebuilding of Europe and 
Japan that in some sense was equivalent to the reproletarianization 
of their societies. The result was a powerful breadth engine, particu- 
larly for the large U.S. firms that saw their profits soar during that 
period. The macroeconomic result in the industrialized countries- 
anomalous from a conventional viewpoint but consistent with dif- 
ferential accumulation-was rapid economic growth averaging 6% 
during that period, combined with low inflation of only 3 percent. 
This picture was inverted in the 1970's. By then, the German 
and Japanese "miracles" had already run out of steam, while West- 
ern rates of population growth dropped sharply. Foreign investment 
'I? Strictly speaking, and contrary to our stylized characterization of depth, the 
Great Depression brought deflation, not inflation. This observation, however, is true 
only from an aggregate viewpoint. As Gardiner Means (1935) showed in his inno- 
vative study of the United States during that period, the nature of the crisis was highly 
uneven. For smaller firms with little market power the crisis was largely one of sharply 
falling prices and only a moderate drop in output. The large firms, on the other hand, 
were able to keep their prices relatively stable and even raise them, while letting their 
output fall by as much as 80% in some cases. In other words, stagflation, although in- 
visible in the aggregates, was already present, if only in embryonic form. 
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could have provided a way out, yet outlets for such investment in de- 
veloping countries remained hindered by communist or statist re- 
gimes. Faced with these obstacles to breadth, dominant capital 
groups in the developed world were once again driven toward 
depth, with the average rate of inflation during the 1970's rising to . 
8% and the average rate of economic growth dropping to 3 percent. 
And, as before, the new depth regime was accompanied by height- 
ened conflict and violence. This time, though, the conflict was 
played out mostly in the outlying areas of the developing world, ini- 
tially in Southeast Asia and subsequently in the Middle East. 
Enter the Middle East 
The role of the Middle East in global capitalism provides a 
good illustration of the temporal spread and geographical integra- 
tion of differential accumulation." Until the late 19409s, the region 
was "out of sync" with the global cycle of differential accumulation. 
Its energy resources had already been parceled out by the interna- 
tional oil companies in the 1920's; but with the world awash with 
oil, these companies mostly "sat on their concessions" and pro- 
duced little. As a result, the Middle East remained relatively iso- 
lated, and when Europe slipped into stagflation and conflict dur- 
ing the 1920's and 1930's, flight capital searching for safer havens 
turned the region into a prosperous "emerging market." After the 
war the tables turned. The Middle East-until then a truly outlaying 
area-suddenly became a center stage for the global drama of dif- 
ferential accumulation. 
Initially, the link was pretty simple, with oil from the region 
helping sustain the growth underpinnings of global breadth. Dur- 
ing the early 1970's, however, when differential accumulation shift- 
ed into depth, the relationship became more complicated. As we 
noted earlier, the inflationary depth regime of the 1970's and 
1980's was largely a consequence of dominant capital "running out 
of breadth." This exhaustion in turn was partly the result of bipo- 
lar geopolitics that prevented capitalist expansion into outlying ar- 
eas and contested Western control over "strategic regions," particu- 
larly the Middle East. 
" For a detailed examination of the Middle East and global differential accumu- 
lation, see Nitzan & Bichler (1995), Bichler & Nitzan (1996), and Nitzan & Bichler 
(2002: ch. 5 ) .  
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One key consequence of this antagonism was an intense arms 
race. In this context, it is not surprising that arms exports-of which 
over one-third were now going to the Middle East-roughly followed 
the periodicity of Western inflation: the first process nourished the 
antagonism and violence of depth, the second its redistributional 
mechanism. Global arms exports and inflation both rose until the 
mid-1980's, peaked as the Cold War began to wane, and went into a 
free fall with the disintegration of communism and the onset of 
global breadth (see Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: 77, figure 2.10). More- 
over, the two processes were causally connected: as we shall show in 
Section VIII, military conflict, especially in the Middle East, contrib- 
uted to rising energy prices, and therefore to higher inflation. 
The late 1980's marked the beginning of yet another breadth 
phase-this time at the global level. On the surface, the new breadth 
regime was somewhat anomalous according to our "stagflation cri- 
teria": inflation in the industrial countries dropped sharply-yet, 
unlike in the previous cycles, growth did not revive. A closer inspec- 
tion, however, may explain why. First, with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the wholesale capitulation of statist ideology, the entire 
world was finally open for capitalist expansion. The result was that 
although external breadth for dominant capital fizzled in the indus- 
trial countries proper, it remained strong outside of these countries, 
particularly in developing ~s ia . "  Moreover, cheap imports from Asia 
helped keep inflation in the industrial countries low despite the lat- 
ter's domestic stagnation. Secondly, the ideological demise of public 
ownership and the mixed economy opened the door for the privati- 
zation of state assets and government services-a process that, from 
the viewpoint of dominant capital, was tantamount to green-field in- 
vestment.36 Thirdly and most importantly, the decline of statist ide- 
ology weakened the support for "national" ownership, thus contrib- 
'' During the early 1990's, GDP growth in East Asia averaged 9%, compared with 
less than 3% in the industrialized countries. During that period, U.S.-based transna- 
tional corporations saw their net profit from operations in "emerging markets" rise to 
20% of their total net profit, up from 10% in the 1980's (Nitzan, 1996). 
96 Although government deficits declined to around 1% of world GDP in the late 
1990's, down from their all time high of over 5% in the early 19801s, overall govern- 
ment expenditures on goods and services have continued to rise. By the early 2000's, 
these expenditures surpassed 17% of world GDP, compared to less than 14% in the 
1960's (computed from World Bank data). The privatization of such services-includ- 
ing transportation, water, infrastructure, education, and security-typically takes the 
form of giving/selling them to dominant capital, which contributes to differential ac- 
cumulation in a manner similar to green-field investment. 
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uting to the spread of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This 
combination of expansion into less developed countries, privatiza- 
tion, and corporate amalgamation helped sustain a powerful drive 
of breadth through merger for large Western corporations, despite 
the lackluster growth of their "parent" markets. 
The Globalization of Ownership 
Differential accumulation operating through corporate amalga- 
mation has had a deep, if unrecognized, impact on the decline of 
statist ideology. As we have seen, over the past half century, and par- 
ticularly since the 1980's, mergers have become global in scope. In- 
creasingly, capital has been flowing not only from the so-called 
"core" to the "periphery," but also in other directions-from the 
"periphery" to the "core," as well as within the "core" and "periph- 
ery" clusters themselves. The cumulative effect of this process is il- 
lustrated in table 2. 
In 1900, at the zenith of the imperialist era, foreign assets were 
equivalent to 20% of global GDP. British capitalists, already in rela- 
tive decline, owned roughly half of these assets (down from 78% in 
1855). The next half-century witnessed a sharp decline, with the ra- 
tio of foreign assets to GDP falling to a mere 5% in 1945. In 1960, 
U.S. owners, having taken the primacy from their U.K. peers, con- 
trolled half of these assets (with U.K. capitalists down to 41 percent). 
From then, foreign investment again started to accelerate, and with 
cross-border mergers gathering speed, the ratio of foreign assets to 
world GDP soared from record to record. In 2000, the ratio reached 
an all time high of 92 percent. The United States, though, was a fol- 
lower, not a leader in this process. Owners from other countries ex- 
panded their foreign holdings twice as fast and, as a consequence, 
by the end of the twentieth century the overall share of owners 
based in the United States dropped by one-half, to 25 percent.Y7 
37 During the 1990's, capital outflow from developing countries accelerated dra- 
matically, with massive consequences for the global distribution of ownership. For in- 
stance, in South Africa the ratio of total foreign assets to GDP rose more than three- 
fold, from 25% in the early 1990's to over 80% in the early 2000's, while in South 
Korea this ratio increased by more than fourfold, from 10 to 40 percent. By contrast, 
in the United States, the ratio merely doubled, from 40 to 80% (based on IMF Balance 
of Payment Statistics data through WRDS). 
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Table 2 
The Globalization of Ownership 
Ratio of Global Share of Global Gross 
Gross Foreign Foreign Assets* (%) 
Assets* to Global 
Year GDP (%) U.K. Owners U.S. Owners 
* Gross foreign asset stocks consist of cash, loans, bonds, and equities owned 
by non-residents. 
Source: Obstfeld & Taylor, 2004: 52-53, table 2-1. 
There was also a rapid penetration into the United States itself. 
According to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, in 2003, U.S. residents 
owned $7.9 trillion abroad-but foreigners already owned far more 
in the United States: $10.5 trillion in total, roughly 20% of all U.S. 
assets, private and public, real or imaginary. Dependency on foreign 
earnings has been rising across the board. According to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, U.S.-based transnational firms presently 
receive one-third of their profit from foreign operations, compared 
with 5% 50 years ago; a similar dependency on foreign operations is 
growing in other countries, both developed and developing. 
Thus, driven by the imperatives of power, differential accumula- 
tion via cross-border merger has made global ownership-both of pri- 
vate assets and public debt-a reality, even in the United States. 
Note our specific emphasis here on global ownership rather than 
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"globalization" more broadly. The latter term has been used to de- 
note a plethora of processes, ranging from culture, through ideol- 
ogy, to religion, politics, trade, production, and technology. These 
processes are not new. What is new in present-day capitalism is 
that, for the first time in history, these processes are increasingly 
encompassed by the progressive "capitalization" of social relations 
on a world scale; that is, by the progressive "commodification of 
power" into universally vendible units. The globalization of owner- 
ship implies both the "discounting" of more and more aspects of 
social power into asset prices and the increasing ability to buy and 
sell this commodified power anywhere in the world. 
Increasingly, the prime purpose of foreign investment is not to 
expand production, but to control the social process. And with capital 
flowing in all directions, the main consequence has been to trans- 
form dominant capital itself into a progressively global entity. State 
officials continue to think in aggregate terms, talking in public 
about the "national interest" and in private about their "own" capi- 
talists. But this "nationalist" emphasis is increasingly out of touch 
with the changing reality. State policies are "discounted" into asset 
prices-only that those who accumulate those assets can no longer 
be easily classified as "American," "European," "Brazilian," or 
"South Korean." 
VIII. THE CURRENT CROSSROADS 
With these considerations in mind, we can now turn to assess 
the current conjunction of world capitalism. Consider again the 
breadth phase of the 1980's and 1990's as charted in figure 8. On 
the one hand, we saw a global merger mania sustained on the back 
of neoliberal ideology, deregulation, and capital mobility in a 
"global village." On the other hand, we observed stagflation taking 
a free fall, a decline that went well with the neoliberal rhetoric of 
small government and sound finance. 
But in 2000 we hit a turning point. Mergers have collapsed, the 
stock market has melted, and the "new economy" has been ex- 
posed as a fraud. Historically, falling mergers have triggered rising 
stagflation, and figure 8 indeed suggests that in 2002 the long 
downtrend of stagflation may finally have bottomed out. 
So far, the shift toward higher stagflation has been hesitant. 
Twenty years of neoliberalism and free trade have created massive 
excess capacity, huge competitive pressures coming mainly from 
East Asia, and a capitalist consensus that preaches "disinflation." 
During the 1990's, these developments were warmly welcomed. 
The policy lingo was anti-inflationary, and "neoliberal competi- 
tion" helped reduce inflation. But the process has gone too far. So 
much so that in 2003 the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
Alan Greenspan, spoke of "an unwelcome substantial fall of in- 
flation" (Greenspan, 2003). To our knowledge, that was the first 
time since the Great Depression that the Fed has made such a dec- 
laration. And immediately after Greenspan's statement, U.S. Treas- 
ury Secretary John Snow effectively declared the end of a "strong 
dollar" policy (Crooks, 2003), which amounted to a similar policy 
loosening from the fiscal side, with tax cuts and rising spending 
soon to create America's largest budget deficit ever. 
This sudden love for inflation is boosted by an old-new fear: de- 
flation. The fear is not unfounded. In 2002, the ratio of total debt 
to GDP in the United States reached 290%-compared with 165% 
on the eve of the Great Depression. Under these circumstances, if 
prices begin falling, firms will be unable to service their debt-and 
then we face the risk of debt deflation, chain bankruptcies, and a 
total meltdown of accumulation; in other words, the "China Syn- 
drome" of ~ a ~ i t a l i s m . ' ~  The overall sentiment was summarized in a 
recent article by Bill Dudley of Goldman Sacks and Paul McCulley 
of Pimco: "Greenspan must go for higher inflation," they insisted. 
"Inflation is too low, rather than too high," and "the Fed should 
welcome a modest rise in inflation" ("Greenspan Must Go For 
Higher Inflation," Financial Times, Apr. 23, 2003, 17). 
These considerations point to the emergence during the early 
2000's of a broad, pro-inflation coalition. The outer perimeter of 
this coalition is the business sector as a whole that needs inflation 
in order to avert the prospect of debt deflation. The inner circle of 
dominant capital wants inflation in order to continue its differen- 
tial accumulation, now that mergers and acquisitions are in remis- 
98 As the Great Depression unfolded, falling nominal GDP caused the debt-to- 
GDP ratio to soar to over 270 percent. A comparable decline in nominal GDP today 
would push the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 400% (computations in the paragraph and 
note are based on proprietary data courtesy of the Bank Credit Analyst Research 
Group, http://www.bankcreditanalyst.com/). 
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sion. And these forces are supported by central bankers and fi- 
nance ministers who have been priming the monetary and fiscal 
pumps, keeping policy on a "loose" footing. 
Oil Prices, Inflation, and Profits 
But wishful thinking and expansionary policies alone are not 
enough to kick-start inflation, Japan of the 1990's being a case in 
point. To ignite inflation you need a spark. And historically-at least 
over the past 30 years or so-the spark that ignited inflation has al- 
ways come from the Middle East, and, specifically, from the price of 
oil. 
The relationship between oil prices and inflation is illustrated in 
figure 9. The thick line in this chart measures the average rate of in- 
flation in the industrialized countries. The thin line shows the "real" 
price of oil-in other words, the dollar price deflated by the U.S. con- 
sumer price index (CPI). And as the figure shows, since the mid 
1970's, oil prices have been a clear "leading indicator" for inflation." 
Of course, the price of oil does not go up simply because one 
wants it to rise. Someone-and specifically those who sell and buy 
oil-must push/pull up this price. Now, everyone knows that crude 
oil producers, particularly OPEC, benefit from higher oil prices. 
But apparently not too many people realize that the oil compa- 
nies-which are the biggest buyers of crude oil-are also hooked on 
high oil prices. The reason for this addiction is simple enough. A 
rise in the price of crude oil tends to tighten cooperation among 
oil companies and spread panic among buyers; this sweet combina- 
tion has the effect of solidifying and even raising markups; and if 
you multiply higher cost by higher markups, you get much higher 
profits. 
Note that we emphasize here oil prices as a "leading indicator" rather than a di- 
rect cause of inflation. The relationship between oil prices and inflation is only partly 
anchored in the role of oil as a key production input. (The dollar value of oil produced 
in 2001 accounted for only 2.1% of world GDP, compared to 7.5% in 1980-still a siz- 
able proportion but hardly enough to "determine" overall inflation.) The more impor- 
tant reason for the correlation is that the leading capitalist groups tend to view the price 
of oil as a barometer of future inflation and adjust their overall pricing strategies in line 
with its fluctuations. 
NEW 1MPERIAI.ISM O R  NEW CAPITALISM? 
Figure 9 
Inflation and the Price of Oil 
20 120 
* $ price of crude oil deflated by the U.S. CPI. 
Source: International Financial Statistics through Global Insight (series codes: 
L64@C110 for CPI in the industrialized countries; L76AA&Z@C001 for the 
price of crude oil; L64@Clll for the U.S. CPI). 
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The result is that production volumes are relatively insignifi- 
cant to oil profit. The key factor is price-and the higher, the bet- 
ter. In this drama, OPEC is a friend, not a foe of the oil companies; 
certainly there is no need to conquer its oil wells (that is, unless the 
cartel has neglected its duty and let the price drop to $10 a barrel, 
as it did in 1999). The impact of oil prices on the differential ac- 
cumulation of the oil companies is illustrated in figure 10. The 
thick line shows the percent share of oil companies in global cor- 
porate profit. The thin line shows the "relative" price of oil, com- 
puted by dividing the dollar price per barrel by the U.S. CPI, and 
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lagged one year.40 The correlation between the two series is so tight 
that you can hardly squeeze a pin between them. If you know what 
happens to the relative price of oil, you know pretty much what 
happens to the differential profits of the oil companies.41 
Figure 10 
The Price of Oil and the Global Distribution of Profit 
Note: Net profit is computed by dividing market value by the price/earning 
ratio. Data are restated to reflect changes in the constituent companies in the 
series. Series are smoothed as twelve-month moving averages. 
Source: Datastream (series codes: OILNWD for the integrated oil companies; 
TOTMKWD for world total); Global Insight (series codes L76AA&Z@C001 
for the price of crude oil; L64eC111 for the U.S. CPI). 
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40 For monthly data, a series that is lagged one year shows, for every given month, 
the value of the series in the same month a year earlier. Reported corporate earnings 
represent the moving sum of the past four quarters. The full impact on profit of a 
change in the price of oil therefore is felt only after twelve months, hence the com- 
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During the oil crisis of the 1970's and early 1980's, the cost of oil 
shot through the roof. In 1979 a barrel of oil cost over $90 in today's 
prices. During those happy stagflationary times, the oil companies 
pocketed nearly 20% of all global profits. But as differential accumu- 
lation moved into breadth, mergers and acquisitions picked up, in- 
flation fell and oil prices dropped even faster. The oil companies' 
global share of profit collapsed, reaching a mere 3% during Clin- 
ton's presidency. 
To recap, then, the situation on the eve of the 2001 U-turn was 
as follows: (1) firms the world over had become scared of deflation; 
(2) dominant capital developed a yearning for some inflation, now 
that mergers had gone into hibernation; ( 3 )  central banks started to 
worry that inflation was "too low"; and (4) OPEC and the large oil 
companies witnessed the price of oil slide and their earnings fall to 
the abyss. At this conjunction, a rise in the price of oil, hopefully 
feeding into a more generalized inflation, would have made them all 
heave a sign of relief. 
The New Wars 
But, then, how do you get oil prices to go up in a world "drown- 
ing in oil," as The Economist of London put it? ("Drowning in Oil," 
Mar. 6, 1999, 19) The answer is cruel but simple: conflict in the 
Middle East. 
Since the 1960's, Middle East conflicts were closely related to oil 
in more than one way. Most explanations of this link combine "real- 
ism" with "economics." The basic reasoning boils down to an in- 
ternational conflict over raw materials. On the one hand, we are 
told, there are the industrialized countries that "need" cheap oil in 
order to sustain their "growth" and "expanded reproduction." On 
the other hand there are the countries of the Middle East, organized 
through OPEC, whose intention is to extract from the process as 
much "rent" as they can. This broad conflict is complicated by var- 
ious factors: for example, interstate rivalry-say between the United 
States on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union (previously) 
and Europe and Asia (presently) on the other; religious and ethnic 
hostilities in the Middle East itself; or the interests of various "sec- 
tors" and capitalist "fractions" in the industrialized countries. 
In this polemic of high politics and resource economics, few 
have bothered to break through the aggregate front, fewer have 
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done empirical work, and almost no one has dealt with the ques- 
tion of how exactly accumulation by the oil companies fits into the 
picture. Figure 11 shows the history of differential accumulation by 
the "Petro-Core" of leading oil companies-specifically, BP, Chev- 
ron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal-Dutch/Shell, and Texaco." Each bar in 
the figure measures the difference between the rate of return on 
equity of these companies and the average rate of return on equity 
of the Fortune 500 benchmark (with the result expressed as a per- 
cent of the average). The gray bars show years of differential accu- 
mulation; that is, years in which the leading oil companies beat the 
average with a higher rate of return. The black bars show periods 
of differential decumulation; that is, years in which the leading oil 
companies trailed the average. For reasons that will become appar- 
ent in a moment, these latter periods signal "danger" in the Middle 
East. Finally, the explosion signs show "Energy Conf lictsn-namely, 
conflicts that were related, directly or indirectly, to oil."" 
The figure exhibits three related patterns, all remarkable in 
their persistence: 
First, every energy conflict in the Middle East was preceded by a 
danger zone, in which the oil companies suffered differential de- 
cumulation. 
Secondly, every energy conflict was followed by a period during 
which the oil companies beat the average. 
And, thirdly, with only one exception in 1996-67, the oil com- 
panies never managed to beat the average without an energy 
conflict first taking place.44 
This "if-and-only-if" pattern seems almost too stylized to be 
true. Is it possible that the only thing that makes the oil companies 
beat the average are wars in the Middle East? And could it be that 
' Due to Inergers, the data in figure 11 pertain to British Petroleum till 1997 and 
for BP-Amoco since 1998; to Chevron and Texaco till 1999 and to Chevron-Texaco 
since 2000; to Kxxon and Mobil till 1998 a ~ l d  to ExxonMobil from 1999; and to Royal- 
Dutch/Shell throughout. 
4t The collflicts include the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict; the 1973 Aratl-Israeli con- 
flict; the 1979 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1979 Irallian Revolution; the 1979 So- 
viet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 t~eginning of the Iraq-Iran War; the 1990-91 
first (;ulf War; the 2000 beginning of [he second htzfada; [he 2001 Coalition invasion 
of Afghanistan; and the second Gulf War that t~egan in 2003. 
" Although there was no "official" conflict in 1996-97, there was plenty of vio- 
lence, including an Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks. 
the only "pre-requisite" for conflict in the Middle East is the "un- 
derperformance" of several oil companies? 
Figure 11 
The Petro-Core's* Differential Accumulation and 
Middle East "Energy Conflicts" 
- 'Dangerzone' 
'Energy Conflict' 
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* British Petroleum till 1997 and BP-Amoco since 1998; Chevron and Texaco 
till 1999 and Chevron-Texaco since 2000; Exxon and Mobil till 1998 and 
ExxonMobil from 1999; Royal-Dutch/Shell. Company changes are due to 
merger. 
Note: Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations 
(firms deriving at least half their sales revenues from manufact~~ring or min- 
ing). From 1994 onward, the list includes all corporations. For 1992-93, data 
for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special charges. 
Source: Fortune: Standard & Poor's Compwtat. 
Of course not. Human history is always partly a documentary, 
partly an adventure story. Since the narrative of the story is chosen 
by those who tell it, the result is inherently controversial (Carr, 
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1961). The important thing about history, though, is not its particu- 
lar "ending" or "conclusions," but its very possibility-that is, our 
ability to conceive a pattern, a logic, a meaningful sequence in hu- 
man affairs. The particular history examined in this article derives 
from and critiques many layers of prior conceptual revolutions-in- 
cluding the invention of history in Ancient Greece (Castoriadis, 
1991), the mechanical worldview from Ancient Egypt to Kepler, Gal- 
ileo, and Newton (Mumford, 1967; 1970), the dialectical method of 
Hegel and Marx, Gabor's hologram and its metaphoric derivations 
from Veblen to Bohm, the theory of a world-system (Wallerstein, 
1987), and last but not least, the multitude of "postisms." 
Obviously, then, the capitalist history we describe here can never 
be reduced to a single mechanical reason. But to understand this 
history means to give it a pattern, to assign an order to the various 
explanations that constitute its nomos, and to be able to use this pat- 
tern to make some meaningful predictions. 
Prediction as Creative Spark 
These predictions, we should emphasize, are not meant as a tech- 
nical exercise (of the type proposed by Karl Popper). Unlike the an- 
cient wizard and the modern security strategist, we do not mean to 
imply that history is somehow "predetermined" and therefore "fore- 
seeable." Unlike the econometrician, we do not wish to anticipate 
the past by fitting regression models. And unlike the financial ana- 
lyst, our goal is not to outguess the future in order to beat the aver- 
age. The purpose is entirely different: it is to light a spark, to create a 
flash, to enable insight. 
Why do we need such a spark? According to Cornelius Castori- 
adis (1991), every society is constituted and re-constituted by a 
"cognitive closure," a solid wall of beliefs that creates, defines and 
contains its basic ontology and epistemology-to the exclusion of 
all alternatives. Every new theory, including our own, has to pene- 
trate this cognitive closure. In order to pierce this cognitive closure 
the new theory needs to be articulated logically and demonstrated 
historically. But that in itself may not be enough. Logical consis- 
tency and historical insight can easily be ignored. 
And it is here that prediction serves a role: it grabs attention. 
By peering into the unknown future, by providing insight into yet 
unobserved events, by shedding light on previously ignored reali- 
ties, prediction creates a sense of adventure. It is a flare, a stunt, a 
spectacle. It is a light beam that lures us, through the cracks in the 
wall, to look beyond our own closure. 
With this in mind, note that the pattern of accumulation and 
conflict in figure 11 is not a retroactive "prediction" of history. We 
first suggested this pattern in a series of discussion papers in the 
1980's. These papers predicted the first Gulf War of 1990-91.~~ We 
then developed the argument further in a two-paper series pub- 
lished in 1995-96. These latter articles predicted the second Gulf 
War that began in 2003.~%e also situated these processes in the 
larger vista of differential accumulation regimes and, in 1999, pre- 
dicted the coming swing from breadth through merger to depth 
through  tagf flat ion.^' 
Note further that this pattern has not been concocted out of thin 
air. It is not a mere correlation discovered by accident, or through 
mindless computer simulations. Rather, it emerges from a systematic 
discussion that begins from a critique of the "substantive" view of 
capital and develops an alternative theory of "capital as power." This 
theory then leads us to the concept of differential accumulation by 
dominant capital, to the growing symbiosis of capital and state, and 
to the increasing integration of dominant capital and state organs. 
From there, we develop the logic of differential accumulation re- 
gimes, the primacy of corporate merger and stagflation, and the po- 
litical history of their pendulum. It is within this broader under- 
standing of the capitalist nomos that the interaction between the oil 
companies and international conflict needs to be examined. 
The Historical Pattern: Past and Future 
The historical pattern in figure 11, although stylized, is far from 
uniform. This pattern is mediated by shifts in the nature of global 
differential accumulation and by inner conflict within dominant 
capital itself. Specifically, we can identify three distinct periods, 
each characterized by a different regime of differential accumu- 
lation, and each led by a different subset of dominant capital. Fig- 
ure 12 shows the changing fortunes of two such coalitions, expres- 
" See Rowley, Bichler & Nitzan (1989); Nitzan, Rowley & Bichler (1989), and 
Bichler, Rowley & Nitzan (1989). 
46 See Nitzan & Bichler (1995) and Bichler & Nitzan (1996). 
47 See Nitzan (1999; 2001) and Nitzan & Bichler (2002: ch. 2). 
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sed as the percent share of each group in global net profit. The 
first group, which we label the "Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coali- 
tion," comprises the world's listed armament contractors and oil 
companies. The second group, the "New Economy Alliance," is 
made of listed hardware and software information technology 
firms that operate mostly in civilian markets. By comparing the 
progression of the series in figure 11 and figure 12, we can make 
sense of the broad pattern of global differential accumulation, of 
the changing role of the two coalitions within dominant capital, 
and of the troubled history of Middle East "Energy ~ o n f l i c t s . " ~ ~  
During the depth era of the 1970's and early 1980's, global dif- 
ferential accumulation was fuelled by sta@lation, driven by conflict, 
and idealized by superpower confrontation. The leading faction 
within dominant capital was the "Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coali- 
tion," whose overall share of global profits peaked at over 20% (fig- 
ure 12). In this context, the largest oil companies, being politically 
front and center, managed to beat the average comfortably, with only 
occasional setbacks that were quickly "corrected" by Middle East 
conflicts (figure 1 1). 
During the breadth period of the late 1980's and 1990's, merger 
replaced inflation as the main engine of global differential accu- 
mulation, superpower confrontation gave way to talk of a "global vil- 
lage," and war profits made room for peace dividends. The leading 
faction of the breadth phase was the "New Economy Alliance," 
48 The composition of the different coalitions, their operational boundaries, and 
their financial indicators of interest have all changed over-the years. The changes re- 
flect the incessant restructuring of the different groups as well as the availability of 
data. In our early studies, during the 1980's, we defined the "Weapondollar-Petrodol- 
lar Coalition" as comprising nine armament groups and six oil companies (Bichler, 
Rowley & Nitzan, 1989; Rowley, Bichler & Nitzan, 1989). In the mid 1990's, we ex- 
panded the boundaries to include sixteen armament contractors and six oil firms 
(Nitzan & Bichler, 1995; Bichler & Nitzan, 1996). By the early 2000's, after massive 
consolidation, the composition of the coalition again changed. It now included six 
leading oil companies and seven key armament firms (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: 269, 
table 5.4). The key financial indicator in these studies was net profit. The "New Econ- 
omy Coalition" (which we also called the "Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coalition") was 
introduced in 2002. Operationally, it included the 54 leading firms in the S&P index. 
We contrasted this coalition with a comparable proxy for the "Weapondollar-Petro- 
dollar Coalition." This proxy comprised nine aerospace/defense companies, eleven 
domestic integrated oil companies, and six international integrated oil companies, all 
aggregated by the S&P index (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: 272, figure 5.9 and 294-96). 
This latter comparison centered on market capitalization rather than profit. The op- 
erational definition of the two coalitions in thepresent article is much wider, in thatit 
includes all listed companies (rather than only the largest ones). 
whose hectic mergers and leveraged hype helped send its global 
profit share to 14% by the end of the period, while that of the 
"Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition" sank to an unprecedented low 
of 3% (figure 12). Neoliberal rhetoric replaced the welfare-warfare 
state, conflicts in the Middle East grew fewer and farther between, 
and the large oil companies commonly trailed the average (figure 11). 
Events over the past few years suggest that this second period 
may have come to an end: the long merger boom has collapsed, 
stagflation has picked up, and the global trajectory has shifted 
from peace dividends back to war profits. Whether these develop- 
ments represent a mere historical blip or the beginning of a long 
depth regime, is of course much too early to tell and certainly be- 
yond the scope of this article. We hope to widen the historical pic- 
ture in our future work. In the meantime, we restrict ourselves to 
several "positivist7' propositions about what may lie ahead. 
Looking forward, our framework in this article suggests three 
possible paths: (1) differential accumulation through renewed 
breadth, (2) differential accumulation via depth, or (3) differential 
decumulation. As these lines are being written (late 2004), there are 
preliminary signs that merger activity has began to revive after 
three years of sharp declines. If this revival gains momentum, dom- 
inant capital will be all too happy to bury the stagflation hatchet. 
But the merger upswing could falter (as it did in the 1900's, the 
1930's, and early 1970's; see figure 4)-and if it does fade, domi- 
nant capital will likely prefer stagflation over differential decumu- 
lation. 
The conditions for this latter scenario remain in place. Neolib- 
era1 breadth requires relative price stability-but as we have seen, 
there is now a growing pro-inflation coalition supported by domi- 
nant capital in general and the oil companies in particular, along 
with accommodative central bankers and finance ministers. For this 
inflation to take hold, oil prices have to go up, and for oil prices to 
go up there needs to be continued conflict in the Middle East. This 
conflict, popularly known as the "infinite war on terror," is detri- 
mental to capital mobility, the lifeline of global breadth. Finally, the 
"war on terror" justifies rising military spending; soaring military 
expenditures means the end of "fiscal discipline" and "lean govern- 
ment"; and policy profligacy makes capitalists think of inflation. If 
unchecked, these processes will undermine the conditions for re- 
newed breadth; and without the prospect of breadth, the road will 
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be clear for global depth, along with stagflation, instability, and 
conflict. 
Figure 12 
Shares of Global Net Corporate Profit 
percent 
The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
(Integrated Oil and Defense) 
The New Economy Alliance 
(Information Technology Hardware, 
Telecom Equipment and Software 
and Computer Services) 
Note: Net profit is computed by dividing market value by the price/earning 
ratio. Series denote monthly data smoothed as twelve-month moving averages. 
Source: Datastream (series codes TOTMKWD for world total; OILINWD for 
integrated oil; DEFENWD for defense; INFOHWD for information technology 
hardware; TELEQWD for telecom equipment; SFTCSWD for software and 
computer services). 
New Imperialism or New Capitalism? 
The capitalism of our times is certainly oppressive and violent- 
although probably less so than the capitalist imperialism of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and far less so than the prior, 
noncapitalist empires of the Orient, Arabia, Europe, and the 
Americas. But oppression and violence alone do not make capital- 
ism imperial, no matter how catchy the term may sound. 
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The hallmarks of the capitalist imperialism of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries were pretty specific: 
First, unlike prior imperialisms, this one was clearly capitalist; it 
was dominated by capitalist owners and driven by the impera- 
tive of capital accumulation. 
Secondly, it was based on a clear statist/geographic distinction 
between core and periphery. 
Thirdly, it involved territorial conquest in the periphery and 
conflict between the core states themselves. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, it was fuelled by the 
systematic export of capital from the core to the periphery on 
the one hand, and by the visible plunder and apparent exploi- 
tation of the periphery by the core on the other. 
Following Hobson, Luxemburg, Hilferding, and Lenin the the- 
ory of Monopoly Capitalism provided a pretty consistent frame- 
work for understanding these features. Later, the process of de- 
colonization gave rise to various theories of dependency. But these 
features themselves have now changed.4g Furthermore, some of the 
key categories with which these features were analyzed have be- 
come difficult if not impossible to use. 
Accumulation today is also capitalistic-but it no longer has the 
clear hallmarks of imperialism. We can certainly speak of the power 
of capitalists to control and shape society, perhaps more than ever 
before. But we can no longer easily root that power in the "exploi- 
tation" of workers who are not being paid the full "value" of their 
labor. Production certainly is a key aspect of capitalist power, yet its 
pseudoquantities shed no light on the accumulation of such power 
denominated in money terms. We can quantify the architecture of 
power, but we cannot denominate this architecture in units of "ab- 
stract labor" and definitely not in units of "surplus value." And 
without abstract labor and surplus value, a whole host of derivative 
concepts-from "exploitation," to "expanded reproduction," to "the 
falling tendency of the rate of profit," "unequal exchange," "pro- 
ductive vs. unproductive labor," "fictitious vs. industrial capital," 
etc.-lose their analytical meaning. 
49 For a penetrating critique of Leninist and Trotskyist analyses of capitalist devel- 
opment in the twentieth century, see Machover (1999). 
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The mechanisms of accumulation now go way beyond the so- 
called "process of production." They encompass, in theory as well 
as in practice, the entire gamut of power in society. The "class 
struggle" that once seemed centered on the factory floor, has now 
spread into every aspect of social existence and inexistence. The 
underlying goal is to produce not more goods and services, but 
more predictable social subjects-ones whose "preferences" could 
be easily molded and whose "reactions" made predictable with a 
statistical "level of confidence." 
Where profits previously seemed to spring out of technological 
advance, they now increasingly hinge on the legal protection of 
technology and other forms of exclusion. Capital increasingly looks 
forward, not backwards. It is financial rather than material. It is 
counted not in productive machines and structures, but in earning 
power and risk. Accumulation increasingly operates through merg- 
er rather than green-field growth; there is no need to conquer with 
the military what you can easily buy on credit. Profits often benefit 
greatly from inflation; where previously capitalists needed to sell 
more, now they can also charge more. 
We can clearly identify state organizations; it is far more diffi- 
cult to separate their logic from that of accumulation. The logos of 
capital are everywhere-Microsoft, DaimlerCrysler, ExxonMobil- 
but their owners no longer have a clear nationality. When the U.S. 
government goes to war-as well as levies taxes, pays subsidies, de- 
values the currency, deregulates its business, changes labor laws, 
scares its population, and what not-its actions are discounted not 
by "American" capital, but by global dominant capital. 
Unlike the U.S. military, this dominant capital can, and does, 
go everywhere. It buys assets in Brazil and Tasmania while selling 
them, on a moments notice, in the United States and China. It is af- 
fected by global developments often regardless of its location-a 
rise in oil prices can benefit owners who live in Stockholm, San 
Paulo, and London more than those who live in Riyadh, Kuwait, or 
New York. Using transfer prices and tax havens, dominant capital 
can change its profit without moving at all. 
The "United States" may be strong or weak, but it is not a capi- 
talist empire. The capitalists who happen to live there are decreas- 
ingly "American" in terms of what they own, and many of those 
who own "American" assets live elsewhere. The "United States" has 
no savings to export; it desperately needs those of others. U.S.- 
based capitalists do not unleash their government against other 
core countries, and when the United States does go to war-in Gre- 
nada, Panama, Afghanistan, or Iraq-the purpose is neither con- 
quest, nor the "exploitation" of the conquered. 
It is not that capitalism has simply grown more complicated. It 
has become different. The capitalist nomos has changed. It is time to 
change our theories. 
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